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ASSUMPTION OF FLOOD RISK
Alexander B. Lemann*
2017 was the costliest year for flood damage in American history.
Somewhat fortuitously, the beleaguered National Flood Insurance Program
came up for reauthorization just as the country was bearing the brunt of
Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. With the program at its borrowing
limit and facing the prospect of being unable to pay claims, Congress punted
on the question of long-term reform by forgiving its past debt and extending
its reauthorization deadline. That deadline has since been extended seven
more times, with little substantive discussion of the widely-felt need for
reform.
Scientists expect a warmer climate to cause more intense rainfall, more
powerful hurricanes, and higher sea levels, all of which will significantly
worsen the flood risk we face. Meanwhile, many see federal policy as failing
to encourage sustainable development. Indeed, the dominant view of experts
is that programs like the National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”) have
made the problem worse, by insulating property owners from the effects of
storms and thus artificially inflating the value of flood-prone real estate. This
viewpoint, however, assumes that the purpose of federal policy in this area
should be to incentivize some objectively optimal level of exposure to the risk
of floods. The behavior of policymakers, on the other hand, strongly suggests
that this utilitarian approach to the problem is not the only—or even the
default—way of thinking about our exposure to risk.
Drawing on tort doctrine, and particularly the defense of assumption of
risk, I argue that there is instead a set of deeply moral instincts underlying
our response to flood risk. The doctrine of assumption of risk assigns
responsibility for the realization of risks not when our decisions to confront
them are objectively rational, but rather when they are made freely, with
meaningful knowledge of the risk and a choice of whether to accept it. These
ideas, I argue, can already be detected in the rate structure of the NFIP, and
yet they are largely ignored in the broader policy debate about how best to
share the burden of flood risk. If tort law represents a distillation and
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; J.D., Columbia Law School,
A.B., Harvard College. I would like to thank Frank Alexander, Natalie Banta, Bruce Boyden, Kiel
Brennan-Marquez, Amanda Cook, Atiba Ellis, Hannah Haksgaard, Mike McChrystal, Kali
Murray, Dan Schwarcz, Paul Secunda, Amanda Seligman, Mark Weber, and workshop
participants at the University of Wisconsin-Madison for helpful and insightful comments.

164

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

application of our common moral intuitions about risk and responsibility, it
can shed light on how this complex problem should be resolved.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................ 165
I. RISING TIDE, RISING COSTS .................................................................. 171
A. A Brief Overview of the NFIP ....................................................... 172
B. The Stresses of Climate Change .................................................... 175
C. Proposals for Reform: The Current Landscape .............................. 177
II. ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND THE MORAL CONTENT OF INSURANCE ........ 181
A. Individualism vs. Solidarity in Insurance Systems ........................ 181
B. Assumption of Risk ........................................................................ 189
III. KNOWLEDGE ......................................................................................... 196
A. The Science of Flood Risk ............................................................. 197
B. FEMA’s Understanding of Flood Risk .......................................... 200
C. Communicating Flood Risk ........................................................... 202
IV. CHOICE ................................................................................................. 211
A. The Choice to Remain.................................................................... 212
B. Notice and the Choice to Arrive..................................................... 214
V. REFORM ................................................................................................ 217
A. Knowledge ..................................................................................... 218
B. Choice ............................................................................................ 221
C. The Effect of Assumption .............................................................. 222
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 223

51:0163]

ASSUMPTION OF FLOOD RISK

165

INTRODUCTION
After spending four days dumping an unprecedented quantity of water on
the Houston area, Hurricane Harvey finally slid off the coast to the south,
leaving the city to begin the gradual process of wringing itself out and
evaluating the damage.1 Major storms are often treated as showing us
something we should have known all along. For many, Hurricane Harvey’s
lesson was that the era of climate change—the Anthropocene—is well under
way. By the time Harvey reached Houston it was no longer a particularly
powerful storm, by the traditional measure of sustained wind speed.2 But,
thanks to the fact that warmer air can hold more moisture, the quantity of
water it dropped was truly immense.3 Multiple rainfall gauges in Houston
recorded quantities of water that exceeded previous records in the continental
United States by 26%.4
Another story told about Harvey was a cautionary tale. Houston, low-lying
and laced with bayous, has always been flood-prone. But a quick series of
bad floods within the past three years suggested a worsening problem. To
many, the storms were illustrations of the perils of the unchecked
development for which Houston is famous.5 By paving over so much of the
open prairie that once surrounded it, Houston had given the water nowhere
1.
ERIC S. BLAKE & DAVID A. ZELINSKY, NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLONE
REPORT: HURRICANE HARVEY 1, 56 (2018), https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL092017_
Harvey.pdf [https://perma.cc/U94T-DLWM].
2.
Id.
3.
Technically, scientists are able to say not that climate change caused Harvey itself but
rather that it dramatically increases the chance of a Harvey-like event occurring. See Mark D.
Risser & Michael F. Wehner, Attributable Human-Induced Changes in the Likelihood and
Magnitude of the Observed Extreme Precipitation During Hurricane Harvey, 44 GEOPHYSICAL
RES. LETTERS 12,457, 12,457 (2017) (finding that “human-induced climate change likely
increased the chances of the observed precipitation accumulations during Hurricane
Harvey . . . by a factor of at least 3.5”). Another factor thought to be linked to climate change is
the way Harvey “stalled” near Houston. Weather patterns at the time had pushed the jet stream to
the north, a condition that is associated with climate change. Michael E. Mann, It’s a Fact:
Climate Change Made Hurricane Harvey More Deadly, GUARDIAN (Aug. 28, 2017, 10:07 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/aug/28/climate-change-hurricane-harveymore-deadly[https://perma.cc/C2QF-X7JR].
4.
BLAKE & ZELINSKY, supra note 1, at 6.
5.
See, e.g., Manny Fernandez & Richard Fausset, A Storm Forces Houston, the Limitless
City, To Consider Its Limits, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2wpnVPq
[https://perma.cc/BRQ2-3J42] (noting that “developers’ encroachment into the wetlands and
prairies that used to serve Houston as natural sponges has inevitably exacerbated the misery that
the city is suffering today”). The amount of impervious surface in Harris County increased by
25% between 1996 and 2011. Neena Satija, Kiah Collier & Al Shaw, Boomtown, Flood Town,
(Dec.
7,
2016),
https://projects.propublica.org/houston-cypress/
PROPUBLICA
[https://perma.cc/D5P2-KDTV].
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else to go. Where once it might have soaked into marshy grasslands, it now
slid across impermeable barriers of asphalt and concrete, filling bayous and
reservoirs well past capacity.6
As an illustration of this hubris there was no better example than Canyon
Gate, a neighborhood that was constructed entirely within one of Houston’s
two enormous flood control reservoirs. In a series of feature articles entitled
Built to Flood, the New York Times profiled Canyon Gate, telling the story of
its construction and destruction and the people who call it home.7 How could
anyone be so foolish, the articles seem to ask, as to build a house inside a
flood control reservoir? Canyon Gate might be the poster child for an
argument that is frequently heard in the current debate over how to manage
our ever-increasing flood risk. That argument holds that many of the people
flooded in events like Hurricane Harvey knew the risks to which they were
exposing themselves and thus deserve little of our sympathy or, perhaps more
to the point, our money.8
As climate change causes rising sea levels, more intense hurricanes, and
heavier rainfall all over America, the systems by which we allocate and
redistribute the costs of flooding are being placed under increasing strain. The
National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”), in particular, has come to be
seen as the leading indication that our approach to the problem is “broken.”9
6.
See, e.g., Samuel D. Brody et al., Identifying the Impact of the Built Environment on
Flood Damage in Texas, 32 DISASTERS 1, 1 (2008) (analyzing factors contributing to flood
damage and finding that “naturally occurring wetlands play a particularly important role in
mitigating flood damage”).
7.
Tim Wallace et al., How One Houston Suburb Ended Up in a Reservoir, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2FWQ9Ji [https://perma.cc/8LPA-VP5X].
8.
See ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE 79 (1991) (“If a citizen of a large and
geographically diverse nation like the United States builds his home in a flood plain, or near the
San Andreas fault, or in the heart of tornado country, then the risk of flood, earthquake, or
crushing winds is one he chooses to bear, since those risks could be all but eliminated by living
elsewhere.”); Greg Hanscom, Dreading Water: Should Coastal Communities Bear the Cost of
Future Floods?, GRIST (Feb. 5, 2014), https://grist.org/politics/dreading-water-should-coastalcommunities-bear-the-cost-of-future-floods-2/ [https://perma.cc/JQE5-Q7U8] (“If you choose to
live in a place that is vulnerable to storm surges or floods, you will have to take that risk upon
yourselves.”); Editorial, Hold Strong on Flood Insurance, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/hold-strong-on-flood-insurance/2014/02/02/
5305ac62-8ab5-11e3-833c-33098f9e5267_story.html [https://perma.cc/CX2K-ZFYR] (“[I]t
takes some chutzpah for NFIP beneficiaries to act entitled to subsidies from the vast majority of
taxpayers who chose not to live on the beach . . . .”); Judith Kildow & Jason Scorse, End Federal
Flood Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2012), https://nyti.ms/2wc09rm [https://perma.cc/F6DDTP6E] (“If they choose to live in harm’s way, they should bear the cost of that risk — not the
taxpayers.”) .
9.
Mary Williams Walsh, A Broke, and Broken, Flood Insurance Program, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 4, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2hEsXBi [https://perma.cc/6UJE-RHX7].
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Because the NFIP has been in debt to the Treasury since Hurricane Katrina
in 2005, it is often described as providing a subsidy to its flood-prone policy
holders in the form of artificially cheap insurance premiums.10 By the time
the 2017 hurricane season had wound down, the NFIP’s debt to the Treasury
was rapidly approaching its statutory limit of $30.4 billion.11 With the entire
program set to expire unless reauthorized by Congress in September, the time
seemed ripe for wholesale reform.12
In both the popular press and the academic literature, there is nearuniversal agreement that reform of the NFIP should be focused on
eliminating subsidized rates entirely, so that all policyholders pay rates that
reflect the full measure of the risk they face individually, known as
“actuarial” rates.13 One striking feature of this call for reform is how it differs
10. See, e.g., Ike Brannon & Ari Blask, The Government’s Hidden Housing Subsidy for the
Rich, POLITICO (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/08/08/hiddensubsidy-rich-flood-insurance-000495.
11. Diane P. Horn, National Flood Insurance Program Borrowing Authority, FED’N AM.
SCIENTISTS
(Sep.
10,
2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/IN10784.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S3FX-LAAE].
12. Walsh, supra note 9 (noting calls for reform from an “unusual coalition of insurers,
environmentalists, and fiscal conservatives”). As the NFIP was approaching its borrowing limit
in the early Fall of 2017, Mick Mulvaney, director of the Office of Management and Budget, sent
a letter to Vice President Mike Pence and congressional leaders urging Congress to forgive $16
billion of the NFIP’s debt to cover expected claims from that season’s hurricanes while also
passing a package of long-term reforms. Letter from Mick Mulvaney to Michael Pence (Oct. 4,
2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/Letters/Letter%20
regarding%20additional%20funding%20and%20reforms%20to%20address%20impacts%20of
%20recent%20natural%20disasters.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KWT-RYHR]. The debt forgiveness
was passed, but Congress has not yet acted on various proposed reforms.
13. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-425, FLOOD INSURANCE:
COMPREHENSIVE REFORM COULD IMPROVE SOLVENCY AND ENHANCE RESILIENCE (2017),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/684354.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC34-ATZ8]; Omri Ben-Shahar &
Kyle D. Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insurance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 571,
571 (2016) (arguing that “existing government subsidies induce excessive development (and
redevelopment) of storm-stricken and erosion-prone areas”); Robin Kundis Craig, Harvey, Irma,
and the NFIP: Did the 2017 Hurricane Season Matter to Flood Insurance Reauthorization?, U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); Chad J. McGuire, Examining Legal and
Regulatory Barriers to Climate Change Adaptation in the Coastal Zone of the United States, 4
COGENT ENVTL. SCI. 1, 9 (2018) (“[T]he inherent subsidies created in national flood insurance
and disaster relief must be removed so the public can properly gauge coastal risk.”); Editorial,
Hold Strong on Flood Insurance, supra note 8; Editorial, How Federal Flood Insurance Puts
Homes at Risk, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2xBwGpL [https://perma.cc/V5P8TB9N] (“The biggest change would be to have premiums reflect the actual overall risk.”). I took
this position myself in my early writing on this topic. Alexander Lemann, Rolling Back the Tide:
Toward an Individual Mandate for Flood Insurance, 26 FORDHAM ENVTL L. REV. 166, 210
(2015). There are notable exceptions to this consensus view. Robert Verchick and Lynsey
Johnson, for example, are careful to note the harsh effects a wholesale adoption of actuarial rates
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from the way we manage many other forms of risk.14 Another is that it has
been tried before. In 2012, Congress passed the Biggert-Waters Flood
Control Act, which eliminated virtually all categories of subsidized
premiums.15 Twenty months later, facing a groundswell of opposition,
Biggert-Waters was largely repealed.16 Despite being treated as the obviously
wise policy solution to the problem of flood risk by experts from across the
political spectrum, actuarial rates have proved to be elusive.
The call for actuarial rates is usually based on two related ideas. First, by
eliminating too-cheap subsidized rates, the NFIP would presumably collect
more in premiums, helping offset its losses in years with major floods and
making it possible for the program to work off its debt.17 Second, by charging
rates that reflect the full magnitude of the risk homeowners are facing, the
NFIP can provide a meaningful signal of that risk, incentivizing efficient
levels of precaution.18 The instinct underlying this latter argument is that
people choose where to live with some knowledge of the flood risk they face
and, if that risk changes, they can choose to leave. This instinct is sometimes
translated into a moral claim, that flood risk should not be socialized because
it is a risk people assume, like the risk of smoking and unlike the risk of being
old. The quick demise of Biggert-Waters suggests that this assumption of risk
instinct deserves more attention. In the policy discussion swirling around

would have. See Robert R.M. Verchick & Lynsey R. Johnson, When Retreat Is the Best Option:
Flood Insurance After Biggert-Waters and Other Climate Change Puzzles, 47 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 695, 715–16 (2014) (noting that “cutting subsidies” “could lead to sudden instability in local
housing markets and push financially strapped owners out of the insurance market altogether,
increasing their vulnerability”); see also Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders:
Governmental and Market Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 3, 44–45 (2006)
(noting that “[e]liminating the grandfathering provisions overnight would cause a collapse in
home values” and proposing instead that subsidies be phased out over a 15 year period).
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. Biggert-Waters Flood Ins. Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, Title II, § 100205,
126 Stat. 916.
16. See Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, 128
Stat. 1020.
17. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 2 (“Eliminating rate
subsidies by requiring all rates to reflect the full risk of loss would address an underlying cause
of NFIP’s debt and minimize federal fiscal exposure.”).
18. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 13, at 571 (arguing that “existing government
subsidies induce excessive development (and redevelopment) of storm-stricken and erosionprone areas”); Scales, supra note 13, at 44 (“Something approaching the market rate is absolutely
essential to signal to consumers that lakeshore views are expensive.”); Michael Faure & Qihao
He, Private Law and Climate Disasters: Insurance Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE
DISASTER LAW: BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 348, 357 (Rosemary Lyster & Robert R.M.
Verchick eds., 2018); Craig, supra note 13.
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flood insurance, these deeper questions—whether and to what degree we
want to socialize the cost of floods, and if so how—are rarely asked.
This Article makes several contributions to this debate. First, it
foregrounds the primarily moral questions lurking behind proposals to reform
the NFIP and begins to address them explicitly. The assumption of risk
instinct is a common one: there is a sense that people who choose to take on
a risk should be responsible for its realization, while those who are exposed
to a risk unknowingly or involuntarily deserve our aid. But, I argue, it is often
wrong to say that people living in flood-prone properties knew the risk they
faced ex ante and chose to accept it. Drawing on tort law’s articulation of this
moral concept—the doctrine of assumption of risk—I argue that this view is
troublingly simplistic.19 In fact, many people do not understand the flood risk
they face in any meaningful sense, and many people do not have a range of
choices when deciding where to live.
Canyon Gate is a perfect example. Although the entire subdivision is built
within the maximum “flood pool” of the Barker Reservoir, the reservoir itself
is normally dry. When it’s not flooded, it contains a large park, complete with
soccer and baseball fields, horse riding trails, a dog park, and—this being
Texas—a shooting range.20 When the federal government completed
19. My argument is not that this area is governed by tort law in any positivist sense, but
rather that tort doctrines reflect a distillation and application of our shared moral intuitions and
thus can shed light on how this problem should (for both normative and practical reasons) be
resolved. Cf. Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of
Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389 (2007) (drawing on products liability law as a
framework for regulating insurance policies). In a methodological sense, this project helps fill a
gap in the literature on disaster law and climate change adaptation, which is largely utilitarian in
its approach. Just as it is now commonplace for theorists to recognize two dominant views of tort
law—a wealth-maximization or efficiency view and a moral or deontological view—I believe
disaster law is susceptible to both modes of analysis. The question most often asked of law in the
context of natural disasters is how it can best be used to nudge us towards some optimal level of
investment in risk mitigation, but disaster law also benefits from philosophical analysis, which
helps shed light on behaviors that appear irrational and unjustifiable from a purely economic
perspective. In this sense I see this project as building on a limited body of work that approaches
these problems from a similar perspective. See, e.g., MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE
SYMPATHETIC STATE: DISASTER RELIEF AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE
(2013); VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE
INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES (1979); EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF
INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002); Kenneth S.
Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. L. REV. 403 (1985);
Molly J. Walker-Wilson, Cultural Understandings of Risk and the Tyranny of the Experts, 90 OR.
L. REV. 113 (2011).
20. See Recreation in Addicks and Barker, U.S. ARMY CORPS ENGINEERS,
https://www.swg.usace.army.mil/Missions/Dam-Safety-Program/Addicks-Barker-Recreation/
[https://perma.cc/S6Q9-RCXN] (last visited Mar. 4, 2019).
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construction of the 13-mile-long earthen dam that encircles the reservoir in
1945,21 the area was mostly undeveloped prairie.22 The government then
began buying up the land within the reservoir. In a decision that would prove
to be consequential, the government stopped short of buying all land within
the reservoir’s maximum flood pool. Instead, it purchased only the land that
would be flooded during a statistical construct colloquially known as a “100year flood,” a flood with a 1% chance of occurring in any given year.23 Areas
outside the 100-year flood plain were left in private hands, free to be
developed into residential neighborhoods in the 1980s, when Houston’s
sprawl reached the area for the first time.24 Meanwhile, most of the people
who moved in had “no clue” that their properties were susceptible to
flooding.25 Filling up Barker Reservoir completely—and thereby flooding
places like Canyon Gate—would require a more severe and therefore less
likely flood, one with a 500-year or even a 1,000-year return interval.
Hurricane Harvey was just such a flood.26

21. GALVESTON DIST., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, WATER CONTROL MANUAL 3-2
(2012), https://www.swg.usace.army.mil/Portals/26/docs/water%20control%20manual/2012%
20water%20control%20manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/EG4P-ZPZH].
22. Neena Satija, Kiah Collier & Al Shaw, Everyone Knew Houston’s Reservoirs Would
Flood—Except for the People Who Bought Homes Inside Them, PROPUBLICA, (Oct. 12, 2017)
https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/harvey-reservoirs [https://perma.cc/4NHR-3878].
23. Complaint at 7, Micu v. United States, 17-CV-01277 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 15, 2017). The two
reservoirs were designed to capture and store more water than would fall during a 100-year storm.
Instead, engineers estimated the probable maximum rainfall that could be expected to occur in
the area, based on a storm that dumped over thirty inches of rain in seventy-two hours in 1899.
Id. at 6. Subsequent storms, including Tropical Storm Claudette in 1979, caused the Corps to
revise its estimate of the probable maximum rain upwards to forty inches in seventy-two hours,
and to increase the height of Barker and Addicks dams, thereby increasing the size of the area
they could flood. Id. at 5–6.
24. Wallace et al., supra note 7.
25. Wallace et al., supra note 7; Satija, Collier & Shaw, supra note 22; see also Audra D.S.
Burch, Brutal Choice in Houston: Sell Home at a Loss or Face New Floods, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
30, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2uwOW6b [https://perma.cc/SU5R-PPLN]; James Drew, Canyon Gate
Homeowners Were Not Warned About Potential Flooding, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 7, 2017),
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Canyon-Gate-bondprospectuses-did-not-warn-12259584.php [https://perma.cc/442S-E667]; Editorial, Homeowners
May Have Had No Idea They Were in Flood Pool, But Many Others Did, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 4,
2017),
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/editorials/article/Homeowners-may-havehad-no-idea-they-were-in-a-12253803.php [https://perma.cc/ZU5W-925S].
26. Residents of Canyon Gate have filed a class action lawsuit against the federal
government, arguing that the flooding of the area constituted a taking for which the plaintiffs are
entitled to compensation. Complaint, Micu v. United States, 17-CV-01277, (Fed. Cl. Sept. 15,
2017). Canyon Gate is not the only neighborhood located within one of Houston’s flood control
reservoirs. There are about 2,000 acres of privately owned land containing thousands of homes
located within Addicks and Barker Reservoirs. Satija, Collier & Shaw, supra note 22.
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The story of Canyon Gate illustrates how hard it is for individuals to
“know” the risk of flooding they face, and to process that knowledge when
making choices about where to live. In fact, the project of knowing the flood
risk one faces is fraught with difficulty. The science of flood risk is
necessarily inexact, and the way FEMA digests that science and produces the
flood maps that form the building blocks of the NFIP is deeply flawed. The
idea of choice is similarly thorny. Many Americans do not choose where to
live from among a menu of cities and neighborhoods with diverse exposure
to the risk of flooding. These observations suggest that there is a significant
group of people who are entitled to some assistance in paying for flood
insurance. We should thus be more sensitive to the argument that people are
entitled to continue paying less than actuarial premiums for flood insurance
based not just on pure need, but also on factors like the length of time they
have lived in a particular place and when their home was constructed, both
of which affect rate calculations today. On the other hand, there is also a
significant group of people who likely did know the risk and choose to
encounter it, and this group should not be entitled to continue paying
subsidized rates, nor should individual properties carry with them an
entitlement to subsidized rates regardless of who lives in them, as they do
now.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief overview of the
National Flood Insurance Program, with particular emphasis on its rate
structure, the looming threat of climate change, and current proposals for
reform. In Part II I draw on literature from insurance law and tort law to show,
first, that the “actuarial model” of insurance is but one way of viewing and
structuring insurance systems and, second, that the moral argument that flood
risk should not be socialized because people subject to it have assumed it is
dated and unpersuasive unless it incorporates meaningful conceptions of
knowledge and choice, much as tort law has over the course of the twentieth
century. Part III examines the problem of knowing the risk of flooding, and
argues that many individuals lack meaningful knowledge of their risk. Part
IV argues, similarly, that many people do not choose where they are going to
live under conditions of freedom. Part V suggests implications of these ideas
for reform of the NFIP.
I.

RISING TIDE, RISING COSTS

The federal government socializes the costs of flooding in a variety of
ways, including building and maintaining flood control structures, passing
massive aid packages in the wake of major storms, and, most importantly for
this paper, through the NFIP. While the total claims paid by the NFIP in the
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wake of even major storms like Harvey or Katrina are usually dwarfed by
one-off aid packages passed by Congress, they are often far larger for the
individuals who receive them.27 NFIP coverage is also a liability rather than
a discretionary aid package, and the total size of that liability is significant:
currently about $1.3 trillion.28 This exposure has drawn increasing attention,
as a series of historically significant losses and increasing awareness of the
impacts of climate change on the nation’s flood risk have highlighted the
degree to which the NFIP appears to be operating at a long-term deficit.
A.

A Brief Overview of the NFIP

The NFIP was created in 1968, after decades of severe floods that had
driven private insurers out of the market for flood insurance. The reasons for
the insurance industry’s unwillingness to write flood insurance policies have
been the subject of some debate, but two factors are widely thought to have
played a crucial role: first, the extreme difficulty of understanding the risk
faced by an individual policyholder (and thus setting premiums at levels that
will cover expected losses), and second, a feature of flood risk known as
correlation.29 When risks are correlated, they are likely to occur at the same
time, leading to large and unevenly distributed losses for insurers. After
Hurricane Betsy (the country’s first billion-dollar storm) struck the Gulf
Coast in 1965, Congress directed the Department of Housing and Urban
Development to prepare a report on the feasibility of a comprehensive
approach to compensating flood victims.30 That report recommended the

27. The average NFIP claim paid for damage caused by Hurricane Harvey, for example,
was $115,430, while the maximum amount of aid funding available under FEMA’s Individuals
and
Households
Program
is
$34,000.
Significant
Flood
Events, FEMA,
https://www.fema.gov/significant-flood-events [https://perma.cc/J7EB-J6J4] (last updated Jan
10, 2019); Notice of Maximum Amount of Assistance Under the Individuals and Households
Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 196 (Oct. 12, 2017). On the other hand, the total NFIP claims paid for the
three 2017 Hurricanes was $9.8 billion, compared with roughly $120 billion in Congressional
appropriations (not including NFIP debt relief). See Brett Lingle, Carolyn Kousky & Leonard
Shabman, Federal Disaster Rebuilding Spending: A Look at the Numbers, WHARTON, U. PA.:
RISK MGMT. & DECISION PROCESSING CTR. (Feb. 22, 2018), https://riskcenter.wharton.upenn.edu/
disaster-aid/federal-disaster-rebuilding-spending-look-numbers/ [https://perma.cc/8FXH-YE83].
28. Policy
Statistics,
FEMA,
https://bsa.nfipstat.fema.gov/reports/1011.htm
[https://perma.cc/XY5Q-JE8Y] (last updated Sept. 30, 2018).
29. See Edward T. Pasterick, The National Flood Insurance Program, in PAYING THE PRICE:
THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 125,
126 (Howard Kunreuther & Richard J. Roth eds., 1998).
30. Id.
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creation of a national flood insurance program, which Congress did by
passing the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968.
In its role as administrator of the NFIP, FEMA undertakes three basic
tasks. First, it studies the risk of flooding in every flood-prone community in
the country, with the aim of developing detailed maps (“Flood Insurance Rate
Maps,” or “FIRMs”) that show, for any individual property, the likelihood of
being flooded. Second, FEMA promulgates regulations that are aimed at
mitigating the risk of flooding in communities that participate in the NFIP
(technically, the regulations direct local governments to incorporate the
mitigation requirements into their building codes).31 The most significant of
these requirements is that all new homes within “Special Flood Hazard
Areas” (areas with a 1% chance of flooding in any given year) be elevated
such that their living areas will remain dry during a 100-year flood.32 Finally,
FEMA sets rates for flood insurance.
Initially, the NFIP did not have a purchase mandate, and it relied on cheap
premiums to attract policyholders.33 From the beginning, one problem was
the premiums that would be charged to houses that existed when the program
was created. Homes that post-date the creation of a flood map covering their
area are subject to the building code’s elevation requirements and therefore
have far lower expected losses in the event of a 100-year flood. Their flood
insurance premiums are thus lower. Homes that predate the creation of a map
are subject to no such requirements (the NFIP does not require that existing
homes be elevated unless they are “substantially”—more than 50%—
damaged in a storm)34 and thus face a much higher risk. At least in part to
induce participation in the NFIP,35 FEMA created a category of rates it calls
“chargeable” rates (more often referred to as “subsidized” rates)36 that apply
to two major groups of policyholders. First, properties that were constructed
before the issuance of a FIRM are entitled to purchase flood insurance at
subsidized rates.37 Second, properties whose rates increase are entitled to pay
their old, “grandfathered” rates, which are often substantially below FEMA’s
current estimate of full actuarial rates.38
This approach to attracting policyholders was essentially a failure, and in
1973 Congress required all properties located within Special Flood Hazard
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See 44 C.F.R. §§ 60.2, 60.3 (2018).
§ 60.3(c)(2).
Pasterick, supra note 29, at 132–34.
44 C.F.R. § 59.1.
Pasterick, supra note 29, at 134.
44 C.F.R. §§ 59.1, 61.7.
Pasterick, supra note 29, at 132.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 7.
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Areas that have a mortgage from a federally-insured lending institution to
carry flood insurance.39 Despite the addition of a purchase mandate, Congress
did not eliminate subsidized rates. Although their share as a percentage of the
total pool of policyholders has decreased substantially, subsidized rates are
still paid by about 20% of policyholders.40 In 2012, Congress passed the
Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act, which eliminated significant
categories of subsidized rates and was hailed as a major bipartisan success.41
Biggert-Waters eliminated the practice of “grandfathering” old rates42 and
also eliminated subsidized rates for second homes, properties that undergo
substantial flood damage or improvements, properties that have flooded
numerous times, and businesses.43 Moreover, under the new law, new owners
of a home would no longer be able to continue paying the subsidized rates
enjoyed by their predecessors.44 Those who acquired flood insurance for the
first time would also not be entitled to subsidized rates.45
Biggert-Waters, poised to move most policyholders to full actuarial rates,
attracted enormous controversy. As homeowners received notices that their
rates would be skyrocketing, opposition to the new law began to build in
many flood-prone communities. What had been hailed as a bipartisan success
now attracted bipartisan scorn.46 Particularly moving were anecdotal reports
that individuals would now be required to pay truly crushing flood insurance
premiums—in one case, a woman reported that her premiums were set to
increase from $595 a year to $4,492, on a $90,000 home.47 Also noted were
widespread fears that the law was having a sudden impact on the real estate

39. Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-234 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4001–4129 (2018)).
40. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 6.
41. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100205,
126 Stat. 405, 917 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4014 (2018)). The bill enjoyed support from both
fiscal conservatives, concerned by the NFIP’s drain on taxpayers, and environmentalists, who
saw higher flood insurance premiums as a way to incentivize more sustainable development.
42. § 100207.
43. § 100205(a)(1)(A).
44. § 100205(a)(1)(B).
45. Id. The law also increased the cap on annual premium increases. These changes and
their history are discussed in more detail in Lemann, supra note 13, at 192–96.
46. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, Popular Flood Insurance Law Is Target of Both Parties,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2014), https://nyti.ms/1k4eRCw [http://perma.cc/G2QG-YSXJ] (“Diane
Mazzuca . . . had been paying $595 annually for flood insurance on her $90,000 home. After
Biggert-Waters ended federal flood insurance subsidies last June, she got an updated bill—for
$4,492.”).
47. Id.
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market, potentially wiping out many homeowners’ equity.48 One of the law’s
lead sponsors, Maxine Waters, claimed she had had no idea the effect it would
have and supported its repeal.49
Just twenty months after Biggert-Waters was passed, Congress passed the
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 (“HFIAA”), which
largely repealed it. The Act reinstated subsidized rates for new policies and
newly purchased properties.50 It also reinstated, with some new limitations,
the practice of grandfathering rates.51 The cost of these changes was offset, at
least in theory, by a new $25 annual surcharge on all residential policies and
a $250 surcharge on policies covering businesses and second homes.52 The
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act was Congress’s last
significant reform to the NFIP. Since then the program’s fortunes have not
prospered.
B.

The Stresses of Climate Change

Until 2005, the NFIP typically collected enough in premiums to cover the
claims it paid to flood victims.53 In one season, Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and
Wilma combined to create $19 billion in claims (more than the entire
cumulative losses of the program since its creation), easily overwhelming the
NFIP’s reserves and forcing it to borrow from the Treasury.54 This
necessitated an increase in its statutory borrowing limit (which had been $1.5
billion).55 The borrowing limit was increased several more times in
subsequent years, as losses from other storms (most notably Hurricane
Sandy) continued to build and the program began making onerous interest
48. See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez & Campbell Robertson, Cost of Flood Insurance Rises, Along
with Worries, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2013), https://nyti.ms/1bO4G4P [http://perma.cc/XNG4RH4T] (reporting that in some areas “home sales have come to a near standstill”).
49. Davenport, supra note 46. As some commentators have observed, this claim is dubious
at best. Verchick & Johnson, supra note 13, at 711–12.
50. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 3, 128
Stat. 1020, 1021–22 (striking portions of Biggert-Waters § 100205, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126
Stat. 405, 917 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4014(g)(1)–(2) (2018))).
51. Id. § 4.
52. Id. § 8.
53. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REDUCING COASTAL RISKS ON THE EAST AND GULF COASTS
50 (2014); see also RACHEL CLEETUS, OVERWHELMING RISK: RETHINKING FLOOD INSURANCE IN
A WORLD OF RISING SEAS 8 (2013) (showing NFIP’s cumulative debt over time). The largest debt
the NFIP had before Katrina was $917 million, incurred in 1997 and paid off at the end of 2003.
Horn, supra note 11.
54. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 50. The program is statutorily entitled to
ask the Treasury for loans when it experiences shortfalls. 42 U.S.C. § 4016 (2018).
55. Horn, supra note 11.
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payments.56 When Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria arrived in 2017, the
NFIP quickly hit its new $30 billion borrowing limit. To make the program
solvent, Congress cancelled $16 billion worth of its debt.57 Despite that relief,
the NFIP currently owes $20.525 billion to the Treasury.58
There are widely thought to be two major contributors to the program’s
recent financial woes. First is the widespread development that has occurred
in the past few decades in flood-prone areas along the coasts.59 Second, and
perhaps far more significant, is climate change. While scientists are generally
loath to assign the blame for any individual event to climate change,60 there
is broad consensus that a warming atmosphere will make flooding worse in a
variety of ways. Warmer oceans might provide more energy to hurricanes,
making them more destructive.61 Warmer air holds more moisture, increasing
the potential for extreme rainfall and flooding from rivers.62 And finally, and
perhaps most catastrophically, thermal expansion and melting ice will cause
sea levels to rise permanently, causing increasingly frequent “nuisance
flooding” on sunny days, increasingly destructive surges on stormy ones, and
finally, permanent inundation.
The precise effect of all these changes on the flood risk in any given area
is extraordinarily difficult to predict.63 But the overall effect on the country
56. Id. The NFIP currently pays about $400 million per year in interest to the Treasury. Id.
Since 2005, it has paid $4.2 billion in interest and $2.82 billion in principal. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster
Policy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas, 604 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 171, 173–76 (2006); Scott Gabriel Knowles & Howard C. Kunreuther,
Troubled Waters: The National Flood Insurance Program in Historical Perspective, 26 J. POL’Y
HIST. 327, 327–28 (2014); Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance
Program and Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 62–63, 66 (1985).
60. This is beginning to change. See Henry Fountain, Scientists Link Hurricane Harvey’s
Record Rainfall to Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2nYKTMz
[http://perma.cc/9FFM-YJRR] (noting that “for years most scientists had said it was extremely
difficult to link warming to specific events. [But] [t]hat has now changed”).
61. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 14–16 (noting that climate models predict
a decrease in the number of hurricanes but also an increase in their intensity and rainfall rates).
62. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 7–14 (Jerry M. Melillo, Terese Richmond & Gary W. Yohe eds., 2014),
https://nca2014.globalchange.gov/downloads [http://perma.cc/6KPJ-B8XR] (last visited Dec. 22,
2018). This problem was vividly illustrated in August 2016, when rainfall in southern Louisiana
caused flooding that killed thirteen people and displaced tens of thousands. The event was the
eighth since May 2015 involving a quantity of rainfall statistically rare enough to have only a
0.2% chance of occurring in any given year (also known as a 500-year flood). Jonah Engel
Bromwich, Flooding in the South Looks a Lot Like Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2016),
https://nyti.ms/2bkXOkk [http://perma.cc/CH2P-M889].
63. See infra Part III.A.
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and on the NFIP will be extreme. A recent report released by the Union of
Concerned Scientists attempted to project the impact sea level rise will have
on coastal real estate. The report estimated that within fifteen years, 147,000
existing homes and 7,000 commercial properties, collectively worth $63
billion, will be at risk of “chronic inundation” (defined as at least twenty-six
floods per year).64 By 2100, 2.4 million residential properties (home to 4.7
million people) and 107,000 commercial properties worth more than $1
trillion will be effectively underwater.65 Other studies have produced similar
figures.66 In many places these effects are already beginning to be felt.67
C.

Proposals for Reform: The Current Landscape

The NFIP’s fiscal troubles and the likely effects of climate change suggest
to most observers that the program is in dire need of reform. The NFIP has
always had two goals that are to some extent inherently in tension. First, it
aims to provide coverage that helps soften the financial impact of major
floods. And second, it aims to help lessen the effects of floods themselves by
imposing adaptation requirements on new construction in floodplains. The
program’s spiraling debt implies that something about this model is broken.
To many, the program’s debt suggests a massive subsidy flowing from
taxpayers to the residents of flood-prone houses. On this view, the NFIP
encourages people to live in harm’s way, by partially externalizing the costs
of flooding. In insurance this is called a moral hazard, the idea that providing
insurance against a risk can increase its likelihood (think of the driver who
64.

UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, UNDERWATER: RISING SEAS, CHRONIC FLOODS, AND
IMPLICATIONS
FOR
US
COASTAL
REAL
ESTATE
4–5
(2018),
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2018/06/underwater-analysis-full-report.pdf
[http://perma.cc/92XN-UDG3].
65. Id. at 5.
66. See Tatiana Schlossberg, Rising Sea Levels May Disrupt Lives of Millions, Study Says,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/15/science/rising-sea-levelsglobal-warming-climate-change.html [http://perma.cc/BNT4-JT83]; see also Matthew E. Hauer
et al., Millions Projected to Be at Risk from Sea-Level Rise in the Continental United States, 6
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 691, 691 (2016) (concluding that coastal inundation could lead to a
population shift comparable to the “Great Migration” of African-Americans out of the South in
the twentieth century).
67. Justin Gillis, Seas Are Rising at Fastest Rate in Last 28 Centuries, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/23/science/sea-level-rise-global-warming-climatechange.html [http://perma.cc/985S-QCM2] (noting that “increasingly routine” flooding is
“making life miserable in places like Miami Beach; Charleston, S.C.; and Norfolk, Va., even on
sunny days”); Justin Gillis, Flooding of Coast, Caused by Global Warming, Has Already Begun,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/science/flooding-of-coastcaused-by-global-warming-has-already-begun.html [http://perma.cc/SG6M-HXR2].
THE
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speeds through town, comfortable in the knowledge that any damage will be
covered).68 Risk-rated premiums are a way of combatting moral hazard
(increase the driver’s premiums for speeding and you might discourage that
behavior), but the NFIP is unable to charge premiums that are adequately
risk-rated whenever policyholders are entitled by law to pay less than
actuarial rates. The NFIP’s debt is also seen as problematic in absolute terms.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office has featured the NFIP on its
“High-Risk List” since 2006 and highlights the risk the program poses to the
Treasury.69
The NFIP has thus attracted a diverse coalition of critics. To smallgovernment types, it is yet another endeavor the government should leave to
the private sector.70 To fiscal conservatives, its huge exposure to catastrophic
losses that get passed on to the Treasury is cause for concern.71 To
environmentalists, it encourages flood-prone development, which harms
fragile wetland and coastal ecosystems, and helps us ignore the long-term

68. See Alexander B. Lemann, Coercive Insurance and the Soul of Tort Law, 105 GEO. L.J.
55, 59–61 (2016).
69. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-317, HIGH RISK SERIES: PROGRESS ON
MANY HIGH-RISK AREAS, WHILE SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS NEEDED ON OTHERS 58 (2017),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/682765.pdf [http://perma.cc/3KEK-RXSK] [hereinafter HIGH
RISK SERIES].
70. See, e.g., IKE BRANNON & ARI BLASK, REFORMING THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM: TOWARD PRIVATE FLOOD INSURANCE 4 (Cato Inst. Policy Analysis No. 817, 2017),
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa817_2.pdf [http://perma.cc/S4PF-2W6L]
(arguing that the NFIP’s problems are “endemic to any government insurance scheme” and that
they “show[ ] the importance of a growing private flood insurance market as an alternative to
government-run insurance”); Editorial, The Swampland Republicans: GOP Senators Balk at Even
Modest Fixes in Federal Flood Insurance, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/the-swampland-republicans-1516145995 [http://perma.cc/P5P4-969E] (“The larger
question is why government underwrites flood insurance when consumers privately insure against
car accidents, fires and other events that damage property.”).
71. See, e.g., DIANE KATZ, THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: DROWNING IN
DEBT AND DUE FOR PHASE-OUT 2 (Heritage Found. Backgrounder No. 3224, 2017),
https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-06/BG3224.pdf [http://perma.cc/KU73-D5FZ]
(“Tinkering with operational reforms will not remedy the distortionary incentives inherent in a
government insurance scheme—especially because the NFIP, as designed, is financially
unsound.”).
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costs and consequences of climate change.72 For liberals, the NFIP looks
suspiciously like a boon to wealthy southerners with coastal mansions.73
In a way, the preceding paragraph overstates the political valence of the
NFIP; one can read dozens of critics of the program without being made
aware of their political leanings.74 That is in part because the NFIP appears
to be so illogical that one need not appeal to any prior political commitment
to make a convincing case against it. There is a rationalist, utilitarian strain
in modern political thought that is common ground for elites of both parties.
From the perspective of incentives and rational policy, it seems obvious that
the NFIP needs to be “fixed,” so that it no longer encourages clearly suboptimal behavior. In a nation of nudges, the NFIP seems to be nudging us in
the wrong direction.
The call for reform of the NFIP thus virtually always includes the idea
that, among other fixes and tweaks, policyholders should be paying full
actuarial rates.75 Some favor simply eliminating the program outright, based
on the assumption that flood insurance offered by private insurers would
feature more accurate risk-rated premiums.76 Within that group, some take
the straightforward view that anyone who fails to secure flood insurance in

72. See, e.g., Brian Palmer, Our National Flood Insurance Program Is Going Underwater,
NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL (July 13, 2017), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/our-national-floodinsurance-program-going-underwater [http://perma.cc/5TZ5-XBWG] (“Climate change makes it
increasingly urgent that we find a fix for our outdated flood insurance program.”).
73. See, e.g., Brannon & Blask, supra note 10 (noting that “the median value of an NFIP
insured home is about twice that of American homes in general” and that “Southeast Atlantic
Coast senators are sure to object to any changes that might make their constituents pay more”).
74. For example, Ike Brannon and Ari Blask are both affiliated with the right-leaning Cato
Institute but have had their views on flood insurance published widely, including by the leftleaning Politico.com.
75. See sources cited supra note 13.
76. See BRANNON & BLASK, supra note 70 (“The ideal ‘reform’ to the NFIP would be to
fully privatize flood insurance.”); Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 13, at 626 (calling for “ending
government-run weather insurance”); Charlene Luke & Aviva Abramovsky, Managing the Next
Deluge: A Tax System Approach to Flood Insurance, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 21–22 (2011); Kildow
& Scorse, supra note 8; Bonnie Kristian, The Perverse Incentives of the National Flood Insurance
Program, WEEK (Aug. 29, 2017), https://theweek.com/articles/721185/perverse-incentivesnational-flood-insurance-program [https://perma.cc/3PDS-42CV]; Daniel Schwarcz, How to Fix
America’s Broken Flood Insurance Scheme, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-to-fix-americas-broken-flood-insurancescheme/2017/09/07/7cb5d2fe-93d9-11e7-aace-04b862b2b3f3_story.html
[https://perma.cc/CD8N-866W]. Interestingly, Ben-Shahar and Logue follow their call to
eliminate the NFIP by observing that the government is likely to simply replace flood insurance
payments with post-disaster aid, which they call “an irresistible instinct of a decent society.” BenShahar & Logue, supra note 13, at 625–26.
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the private market (or finds it too expensive) should be simply out of luck.77
The far more common position, recognizing the fact that a private market for
flood insurance is only now beginning to emerge,78 favors reform. To
reformers there is much in the complex program that seems in need of fixing,
but the overwhelming target is the NFIP’s rate structure. The proposed reform
is straightforward: ensure that all policyholders pay full actuarial rates,
essentially reinstating Biggert-Waters.79
Most critics of the program acknowledge that there is some subset of
policyholders who would face significant financial hardship if forced to pay
for flood insurance at full actuarial rates. The solution to this problem is not
to retain the current system of subsidies and grandfathering, but rather to offer
assistance in one form or another based on need as measured according to
one of several possible variables.80 The idea that anyone should be entitled to
affordable flood insurance for any reason other than pure financial need is
typically dismissed by an appeal to the concept of choice: people living in
flood-prone areas have chosen to do so, and so have no claim to cheap
insurance.81 A more sophisticated argument, built on the same premise and
more commonly seen in academic commentary than in the popular press, is
the idea that flood insurance prices can and should function as Pigouvian
77. See Kildow & Scorse, supra note 8 (“Homeowners and businesses should be responsible
for purchasing their own flood insurance on the private market, if they can find it. If they can’t,
then the market is telling them that where they live is too dangerous.”).
78. As noted above, the NFIP was created at a time when private flood insurance was nonexistent. See Pasterick, supra note 29, at 126. Private companies have been involved in various
aspects of the program since then. See id. at 134–35. Only recently, however, has a market for
purely private flood insurance (i.e., policies written by private insurers that leave those insurers
responsible for paying claims) begun to emerge. See CAROLYN KOUSKY ET AL., WHARTON RISK
MGMT. & DECISION PROCESSES CTR., THE EMERGING PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL FLOOD INSURANCE
MARKET IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2018), https://d1c25a6gwz7q5e.cloudfront.net/reports/07-1318-Emerging%20Flood%20Insurance%20Market%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MYC35WR3]. The extent to which the private market could replace the NFIP is hotly contested and
remains a somewhat theoretical question with private insurance currently representing only 3.5 to
4.5% of residential policies nationwide. Id. at 1–2. The best evidence appears to be that “the
private sector will never be able to write policies for certain properties or locations . . . at a price
homeowners would be willing to pay.” Id. at 2.
79. Various other shortcomings of the program will be discussed in more detail below. They
include principally the idea that all of the program’s rates are too low, because for various reasons
it underestimates the risk its policyholders face. See infra Part III.B. Other more technical
shortcomings that have attracted considerable attention include the underenforcement of the
NFIP’s purchase mandate and the underenforcement of its mitigation and adaptation
requirements.
80. See BRANNON & BLASK, supra note 70; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra
note 13, at 23–25.
81. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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taxes, inducing efficient precaution on the part of policyholders by forcing
them to internalize the costs of their risky lifestyles.82 There is merit to these
arguments, and they are persuasive as applied to large swaths of NFIP
policyholders. But too often they are applied universally, and the premises on
which they are based go unexamined.
II.

ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND THE MORAL CONTENT OF INSURANCE

Making all NFIP policyholders pay full actuarial rates is not a selfjustifying goal. To be sure, it would at least in theory make the program selfsufficient and thus eliminate its effect on the budget. And because the NFIP
is designed as an insurance program, it is often assumed that it should
function like a private insurance company and thus turn a profit, or at least
break even.83 But if the NFIP is seen as a program that is designed to help
people manage the risk of and recover quickly from floods, a deeper question
comes into focus: should the risk of floods be socialized? Insurance
scholarship has long recognized that insurance systems can shift and spread
risk in various ways. Deciding how an insurance system covering a set of
risks should be designed involves evaluating a range of arguments for and
against the practice of risk rating, including arguments from efficiency and
arguments from fairness. The public discourse surrounding the NFIP has
tended to focus on efficiency arguments at the expense of fairness arguments,
and particularly the idea that people do (or do not) knowingly choose to
encounter the risk of flood. The development of tort doctrine in this area
suggests that this argument is only persuasive where people have subjective
knowledge of the risk and a meaningful choice of whether to encounter it.
A. Individualism vs. Solidarity in Insurance Systems
Insurance systems need not be structured so that each individual
policyholder bears the full magnitude of his individual risk. The “actuarial
82. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 13, at 575–76.
83. See Kristian, supra note 76 (contrasting the NFIP with a “normal insurance company,”
which “would jack up the premium price to cover the high risk of floodplain construction”);
Brannon & Blask, supra note 10 (“The NFIP’s main problem is that it doesn’t really function like
private insurance.”). It is perhaps worth noting that many lines of insurance are profitable only
because of the value insurance companies derive from investing their “float,” the pool of
premiums the insurance company holds and draws on to pay claims. The NFIP, by contrast, has
never been able to invest its float. To my knowledge, there has been no empirical study examining
how much the program would have had in reserves when Hurricane Katrina struck in 2005 had it
spent the previous 40 years earning a return on its float.
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vision” of insurance—the idea that an insurance system ideally charges “riskbased premiums based on the best available information regarding the
expected losses of the individuals insured”—is only one of several ways of
seeing insurance systems.84 This view of insurance rose to prominence in the
mid-twentieth century, and supplanted earlier, more solidaristic ways of
seeing insurance, typified by the fraternal insurance societies of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.85 So successful has the actuarial
vision of insurance become that today, “many well-informed people would
deny that it is a vision at all and assert, instead, that it is the model of
insurance.”86 Insurance is thus treated as a phenomenon that calls for purely
economic, rather than humanistic, analysis.87 Nevertheless, a small group of
scholars from various disciplines has long insisted that insurance cannot be
fully understood without examining the culture in which it exists.88
While the actuarial model may be intellectually dominant, it has not totally
supplanted other ways of structuring the insurance systems we rely on today.
It is by no means the case that every form of insurance requires each
policyholder to pay rates that reflect the full extent of her personal risk.89 Put
another way, insurance often contains “cross subsidies,” in which one group
of policyholders pays less than actuarial rates at the expense of another group.
Life insurance is probably the most “actuarial” insurance currently available,
with premiums charged based on age, sex, tobacco use, and successful
completion of a comprehensive health screening.90 Individuals who purchase
84. Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, Embracing Risk, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING
CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 19, at 1, 9–10.
85. See id. at 10; see also JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED
WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 209–10 (2004).
86. Baker & Simon, supra note 84, at 10 (emphasis in original).
87. Id. at 13 (“[I]nsurance has been almost completely ignored by the traditional humanities
and social sciences, at least outside of economics departments and business schools. As a result,
neoclassical economics is now the dominant paradigm for the analysis of insurance and risk. . . .
Policy debates over the nature and extent of public insurance and the regulation of private
insurance are almost always framed in economic terms.”).
88. One pioneering work in this category is ZELIZER, supra note 19. Zelizer, a sociologist,
showed that the rise of life insurance in the early nineteenth century was largely the result of
cultural forces, and particularly a shift from seeing life insurance as an immoral form of gambling
on the lives of one’s family to a form of prudent savings. See id. at 74–102.
89. See Ronen Avraham, Kyle D. Logue & Daniel Schwarcz, Understanding Insurance
Antidiscrimination Laws, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 195, 235–67 (2014) (surveying and analyzing laws
that prevent insurers from discriminating among insureds in pricing premiums).
90. Tom Baker, Risk, Insurance, and the Social Construction of Responsibility, in
EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 19,
at 33, 46 (“[T]here are great variations in the degree of solidarity insurance institutions embody.
Individual life insurance, with its underwriting guidelines and risk classifications, epitomizes the
individualistic end of the insurance spectrum; Social Security, with its mandatory participation
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health insurance through their employers (as the majority of Americans do),
by contrast, often pay rates that have little or no relationship to their
individual risk.
The Affordable Care Act, in particular, reflects the judgment that
individuals should not have to pay more for health insurance based on a
variety of factors that affect their health risk.91 Insurers may not charge higher
rates for people who are obese or diabetic or female,92 for example, despite
the correlation between such factors and the likelihood of needing costly
medical care. Indeed, the only factors insurers can use to discriminate among
individual insureds in setting premiums are age (with the limitation that the
premiums for older insureds be no more than three times as costly as those
for younger insureds), tobacco use (with the limitation that premiums for
tobacco users be no more than 1.5 times those for non-users), type of plan
(individual or family), and geography.93
This structure of health insurance premiums suggests a judgment that must
be in large part moral.94 Our society has decided (not without controversy, to
and income-based premiums and benefits, the solidaristic end. A health care plan with community
rating (everyone pays the same premium) and open enrollment (no one is turned away) is more
solidaristic than a plan that charges the sick more than the healthy and turns the riskiest applicants
away.”).
91. See Jessica L. Roberts & Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, What Is (And Isn’t) Healthism?, 50
GA. L. REV. 833, 836 (2016) (noting that “[t]he ACA notoriously prohibits private health insurers
from considering individual health-risk profiles in underwriting, ratemaking, or renewals, subject
to several exceptions”).
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2018) (addressing discrimination and participation in health
insurance plans funded by the federal government); id. § 300gg(a)(1) (enumerating the sole
acceptable grounds for charging a higher rate).
93. Id. § 18116; see also Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-233, §§ 101–02, 122 Stat. 881, 883, 888 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b) and 42
U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(l)(B)) (prohibiting health insurers from denying coverage or rating premiums
based on genetic information).
94. See Abraham, supra note 19 (exploring the “moral implications” of risk classification);
Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, supra note 89, at 202 (describing laws limiting risk classification
as presenting a tradeoff between efficiency and fairness). Indeed, a utilitarian would argue that
insurance premiums should be risk-rated to the extent that the characteristics associated with
higher risk are within the control of the insured and thus can be subject to a kind of Pigouvian
tax, creating efficient deterrence. Having to pay higher premiums for being obese, for example,
might create an incentive to lose weight (much like a soda tax). And vice versa: socializing the
costs of obesity by banning its use as a factor in setting premiums creates moral hazard,
incentivizing people to become obese. See Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Diabetes
Treatments and Moral Hazard, 50 J.L. & ECON. 519, 527–31 (2007) (arguing that mandates for
medical treatment for diabetes cause people to become more obese); see also Max N. Helveston,
Consumer Protection in the Age of Big Data, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 859, 913 (2016) (noting that
“[t]he ACA’s provisions also limit the impact that insurers’ premium setting practices will have
on individuals’ personal choices”); cf. Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law—A
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be sure) that the healthcare costs associated with obesity or diabetes or
childbearing are not to be borne exclusively by the group of people subject
to those risks, and should instead be spread (or cross-subsidized). Scholarship
on insurance law has identified a range of arguments that have been used to
support laws against risk classification in insurance pricing.95 Generally,
arguments from efficiency favor more individualistic, actuarial ways of
structuring insurance, while arguments from equity favor more solidaristic
ways of structuring insurance.96
On the efficiency side is a basket of arguments that will already be familiar
from the current scholarly and popular dialogue about the NFIP, reflecting
the intellectual dominance of the actuarial vision of insurance. Perhaps most
prominent here is the argument that insurance premiums must be risk-rated
to combat moral hazard. To put the point another way, risk-rated insurance
can function as a kind of “Pigouvian tax,” forcing individuals to internalize
the costs of the risks they generate and thus inducing efficient behavior.97 In
the flood insurance context, the fear is that charging lower than actuarial rates
to some policyholders causes them to move to or remain in flood-prone
houses. The NFIP combats moral hazard not just by charging different rates
to those with different risk but also by regulating behavior through local
building codes.98
Another argument commonly used in favor of actuarial rates is adverse
selection: the idea that charging relatively high rates to low-risk people will
cause them to forego insurance entirely, leaving the insurance pool with an
ever riskier and thus more expensive population.99 The NFIP does have a
purchase mandate, but it only applies within the 100-year floodplain,
rendering it ineffective as a tool against adverse selection by lower-risk
insureds.100 While there are a variety of other efficiency-based arguments that
are used in support of risk-based premium pricing, moral hazard and adverse
selection are the two most important.101
Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 29, 40–41 (2012) (discussing, as an example of this phenomenon, a
fire insurance premium that incentivizes investment in sprinkler systems); Avraham, Logue &
Schwarcz, supra note 89, at 198 (noting that “risk classification by insurers can . . . create
incentives for insureds to minimize risks”).
95. See, e.g., Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, supra note 89; Abraham, supra note 19.
96. See Abraham, supra note 19, at 404.
97. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 13, at 575–76.
98. See Lemann, supra note 13, at 183.
99. This argument figured prominently in the design of the Affordable Care Act’s individual
mandate, which was seen as necessary to combat precisely this problem.
100. See 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b) (2018); Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 76, at 13–15.
101. One efficiency-based argument that is sometimes marshalled against the use of risk
classification in insurance pricing is the idea that certain risky behavior generates positive
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Arrayed against these arguments from efficiency is a set of arguments
from equity or fairness, each of which supports laws against risk
classification in insurance pricing. The most commonly advanced and
important such argument in this context is the idea that people should not be
punished for characteristics that are beyond their control.102 So, for example,
health insurers are permitted to charge higher premiums to those who smoke,
but not to women.103 Laws against risk classification are also often justified
on purely distributional grounds.104 The Affordable Care Act’s requirement
that the elderly pay health insurance premiums no more than three times
higher than the young, for instance, is a cross-subsidy from the young to the
old justified at least in part on the idea that the elderly are in need of
assistance.105
The debate over reform of the NFIP largely ignores this “control”
argument. When scholars and pundits argue that the NFIP should be reformed
so that each policyholder pays full actuarial rates, they often make two
assumptions. First is the assumption that the only argument against actuarial
rates must be the redistributional argument sketched out above. Subsidized
flood insurance rates have often been defended (particularly by the people
paying them and their representatives in Congress) on the ground that higher
rates would not be affordable and so would impose a crushing burden on
those who are mandated to carry flood insurance, forcing them to move and
wiping out their home equity.106 Critics have made two compelling responses
to this argument. First, the cross-subsidy built into the rate structure of the
NFIP from those paying full actuarial rates to those paying subsidized rates
is only defensible on redistributional grounds if there is in fact a correlation
externalities and so should be subsidized through cheap premiums. Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz,
supra note 89, at 210. This argument has been made in the context of flood risk, although not in
these terms or in connection with NFIP premiums per se. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, many
in New Orleans argued that the city deserved the investment the federal government was making
in its recovery and continued protection because of its important role in shaping American culture.
See, e.g., TOM PIAZZA, WHY NEW ORLEANS MATTERS (2005).
102. See Abraham, supra note 19, at 429 (“[R]isk classes should be based on variables that
are within the control of or at least caused by the insured.”); Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, supra
note 89, at 214–15 (“The economic costs associated with [risks that are beyond an individual’s
control] should be distributed in a morally blind manner.”).
103. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2018).
104. Abraham, supra note 19, at 444–45.
105. See, e.g., Theodore W. Ruger, Can a Patient-Centered Ethos Be Other-Regarding?
Ought It Be?, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1513, 1513 (2010).
106. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 13, at 594 (noting that the passage of HFIAA
in 2014 with broad bipartisan support was based in part on the idea that actuarial rates “burdened
lower- and middle class homeowners and small businesses” (quoting 160 Cong. Rec. E309-01
(Statement of Rep. Castor))).
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between flood risk and poverty. If it turned out that those paying subsidized
rates were on average richer than those paying actuarial rates, the argument
from affordability would be much less compelling, to put it mildly.
This empirical question has been the subject of intense debate, with
different studies reaching opposite conclusions.107 Providing a concrete
answer has always been difficult in part because FEMA does not directly
collect data on the financial status of its policyholders and in part because
privacy concerns have prevented it from releasing individualized rate
information that could be compared against other sources of data, like tax
returns. Another challenge has been the shadow population of households
who should carry flood insurance but don’t.
In April of 2018, FEMA released a comprehensive report (mandated by
Congress in the passage of HFIAA four years earlier) analyzing the
affordability problem.108 Using its own internal data on policyholders, FEMA
was able to match insureds with Census data showing their income and
extrapolate these matches to the full population of NFIP policyholders,
obviating the need for many of the creative inferences and data techniques
relied on in previous studies.109 The report produced many striking findings.
FEMA found that those living within flood zones tended to have lower
107. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: FINANCIAL
SOUNDNESS AND AFFORDABILITY 2 (2017), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files?file=115thcongress-2017-2018/reports/53028-nfipreport2.pdf [https://perma.cc/NH7V-YCZN] (finding
that NFIP policyholders tend, on average, “to live in census tracts in which median income is
somewhat higher than median income averaged across all tracts”); CAMILO SARMIENTO & TED R.
MILLER, PAC. INST. FOR RESEARCH & EVALUATION, COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF FLOODING
AND THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM, at xi (2006),
https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/disasters/insurance/nfip_eval_costs_and_consequences.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2T5V-LCEM] (finding that “a higher proportion of households in higher
income brackets own residences in high flood risk areas near coastlines and lakes” but “low
income households typically live in higher risk areas than middle income households”); BenShahar & Logue, supra note 13, at 571 (finding “significant regressive redistribution favoring
affluent homeowners” in study of coastal risk in Florida); Okmyung Bin, John Bishop & Carolyn
Kousky, Does the National Flood Insurance Program Have Redistributional Effects?, 17 B.E. J.
ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, no 4, 2007 at 1, 1 (finding that “premiums as a percentage of coverage
purchased are regressive” but “[p]ayouts . . . as a percentage of coverage purchased, are
progressive, meaning lower-income zip codes receive a larger portion of claims paid”); Matthew
E. Kahn & V. Kerry Smith, The Affordability Goal and Prices in the National Flood Insurance
Program, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24120, 2017) (examining flood
risk along the Gulf coast and concluding that subsidized rates benefit higher income people,
although this finding varies significantly by state).
108. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., AN AFFORDABILITY
FRAMEWORK FOR THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM (2018), https://www.fema.gov/
media-library-data/1524056945852-e8db76c696cf3b7f6209e1adc4211af4/Affordability.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L2ZD-4SLJ].
109. Id. at 4.
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incomes than those living outside of them.110 This gap is even wider if those
who don’t have flood insurance (but should) are included in the analysis.
Within flood zones, non-policyholders have lower average incomes than
policyholders, suggesting that there is a significant population of people who
choose not to buy flood insurance because they cannot afford it.111 Within
flood zones, about 26% of NFIP policyholders are “low income.”112 More
than half—about 51%—of households in flood zones that do not have flood
insurance are low income.113 Notably, there is a good deal of variation in these
figures. In a few states, those within flood zones tend to have higher incomes
than those outside them, and in general those in coastal flood zones tend to
have higher incomes than those in riverine flood zones.114 FEMA’s analysis,
thanks in part to its inclusion of households that do not have flood insurance
but should, demonstrated conclusively that affordability is a major problem
and that addressing it should be a significant part of any reforms to the
program.
On the other hand, the focus on affordability, which could be called the
redistributional argument against risk classification in flood insurance
premiums, does little to support the program’s current rate structure. To the
extent that those who face higher risk have lower incomes, the response has
always been that affordability should be addressed explicitly rather than with
the patchwork rate structure that exists today. Affordability is thus seen as a
concern that supports either a means-tested system for subsidized flood
insurance premiums or some other form of assistance provided outside the
NFIP, like a tax credit.

110. Id. at 11.
111. See SARMIENTO & MILLER, supra note 107, at 48 (“Moreover, low income homeowners
generally cannot afford—and therefore lack—flood insurance.”).
112. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 108, at 6. The report’s income
calculations are based on HUD definitions and are relative to area median income rather than the
federal poverty level. Id. at 12; see also UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, UNDERWATER: RISING
SEAS, CHRONIC FLOODS, AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. COASTAL REAL ESTATE 10 (2018),
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2018/06/underwater-analysis-full-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6BSM-K9Y5] (noting that in many states, “60 percent or more of the homes at
risk of chronic inundation over the next 30 years are valued below the state median” and
highlighting flood-prone, working class communities in Massachusetts and Oregon).
113. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 108, at 6.
114. See id. at 11, 14. This probably explains why some of the previous studies reached
different conclusions. Many academic studies examined only particular geographic areas and only
particular types of risk. Ben-Shahar and Logue, for example, studied only coastal risk in Florida,
which the FEMA report shows is one of the handful of states where incomes are higher within
flood zones than outside them. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 107, at 74; BenShahar & Logue, supra note 13, at 590. In most parts of the country, the opposite is true.

188

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

The public discourse regarding the NFIP has given short shrift to another
of the important arguments often used to support cross-subsidies in insurance
pricing: the “control argument,” which holds that people should not have to
bear the burden of risk factors over which they have no control. The argument
could also be framed from the opposite perspective: it is unfair to force lowrisk insureds to subsidize high-risk insureds when the higher risks they face
are the result of their knowing and voluntary choices. This is a basic moral
intuition that has had an impact on policy responses to insurance systems and
risk taking in a whole range of contexts, from smoking to skiing.115 To those
who support a fully self-sufficient NFIP that charges actuarial rates, this
argument has powerful rhetorical appeal: people have chosen to expose
themselves to flood risk, so they should bear the cost of it themselves.116
That this instinct plays a role in the way we think about flood risk can be
seen in some of the existing features of the NFIP. The NFIP allows two major
categories of non-actuarial rates. First, properties that existed before FEMA
first mapped the risk of flood they faced (which in turn would trigger new
building codes) are entitled to pay subsidized rates. In part this system was
designed to attract policyholders to the program when it was first created.117
It also suggests a judgment that it would be unfair to force people to pay for
the full magnitude of a risk they didn’t know they faced when they moved
into their homes. If a property paying such rates is more than 50% damaged
in a flood, it loses its entitlement to subsidized rates and must be rebuilt in
compliance with building codes designed to mitigate flood risk, which
usually means elevating the house.118 The judgment here seems to be similar:
substantial damage presents the homeowner with a choice, a new opportunity
to decide whether to invest in a more resilient home and face the risk or
simply leave.
The second major category of subsidized rates is paid by properties whose
risk has increased because of a revision in one of FEMA’s maps. When
FEMA releases new maps that show a property in a higher risk zone than it
was before, that property can pay “grandfathered” rates dictated by the old
map.119 In part, this category of subsidized rates was created to mitigate local
115. See Abraham, supra note 19, at 429; see also Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 13, at
594 (“Actuarial fairness has an intuitive appeal, for example, when differences in risks are the
result of individuals’ voluntary choices. It seems fair that smokers should pay higher life and
health insurance premiums than nonsmokers, and that aggressive drivers pay higher auto
insurance premiums.”).
116. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
117. See Pasterick, supra note 29, at 132–34.
118. See id. at 144.
119. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 7.
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opposition to the periodic adoption of revised flood maps120 (which is often,
nevertheless, quite intense121). But again, the judgment appears to be in part
a moral one as well: People should be responsible only for the measure of
risk they chose or, to put it another way, should not be forced to bear the full
burden of higher rates when FEMA determines that the flood risk they face
was actually significantly higher than they thought it was when they moved
in.
It is thus wrong to assume that the NFIP must necessarily be a fully selfsustaining program, or that the only way to make it self-sustaining is for each
individual policyholder to pay full actuarial rates. Indeed, as the Government
Accountability Office has noted (perhaps critically), the NFIP was “not
designed to be actuarially sound in the aggregate, nor was it intended to
generate sufficient funds to fully cover all losses.”122 The NFIP can be
(indeed, has been) designed to function in part as a subsidy from taxpayers to
flood victims. It is this subsidy that has made the program deeply
controversial, but the subsidy’s moral premises have rarely been examined.
Further, as insurance scholars have noted and as can be seen in other, more
solidaristic forms of insurance that remain significant today, insurance
systems can be self-sustaining and include cross-subsidies from various
classes of policyholders to others. Just as the young subsidize the old when
buying health insurance, those who pay full-priced rates for flood insurance
subsidize those who pay discounted rates. The justifiability of the program as
a system of incentives has been rightly questioned; what has received less
attention are its moral justifications.
B.

Assumption of Risk

If the choice to encounter a risk affects where responsibility for that risk
should lie, what does it mean to choose a risk? It is typically assumed that
people who are flooded have made a morally significant choice to expose
themselves to that risk, but there is a difference, long discussed in tort
doctrine and tort theory, between the purely formal illusion of choice and a
knowing, free choice sufficient to create responsibility for the realization of
a risk. By importing a more sophisticated understanding of tort doctrine into
this admittedly non-tort context, the argument that people living in risky
locations have assumed the risk of flooding can be evaluated in a more
120. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 107, at 16.
121. See Sarah Pralle, Drawing Lines: FEMA and the Politics of Mapping Flood Zones 3–4
(2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/faculty/psc/
Pralle_Drawing%20Lines_APSA2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/KU22-ZAL9].
122. HIGH RISK SERIES, supra note 69, at 619.
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nuanced way. Looking at the argument in light of tort doctrine on assumption
of risk suggests many contexts in which it is persuasive—and others in which
it is not. If tort law represents a distillation and application of our common
moral intuitions about risk and responsibility, it can shed light on how this
complex problem should be resolved.
Tort law adds to the debate two key ideas that have thus far been largely
absent. First is an insistence on a more nuanced understanding of the concept
of choice. While early assumption-of-risk cases were content to treat any
action not literally coerced as an exercise of the plaintiff’s free will, courts in
the second half of the twentieth century began to understand that economic
and social pressures could induce someone to remain in a job, say, despite
being uncomfortable about the hazards they might face there. Second, tort
law emphasizes the plaintiff’s subjective knowledge of the risk he or she
faced.123 Only rarely and in limited ways have any of these ideas played a role
in our discourse regarding flood risk.
Assumption of risk was introduced to American courts in 1859 with the
publication of Francis Hilliard’s treatise on tort law.124 While Hilliard tied the
idea to the relationship between “master” and “servant” in a way that
suggested applicability only to workplace injuries, the doctrine soon spread
to other contexts.125 By 1878, a treatise on negligence could describe
assumption of risk as the expression of the “general principle that a party
cannot recover for injury he incurs in risks, themselves legitimate, to which
he intelligently submits himself.”126
Two famous decisions from the early twentieth century illustrate the
promise and peril of assumption of risk, and give a sense of why it remains
123. See, e.g., D’Andrea v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 287 A.2d 629, 633 (R.I. 1972) (rejecting
defendant’s argument that it was entitled to an assumption of risk instruction where plaintiff
employee “should have known” of the danger of falling off a loading platform because “a plaintiff
is not deemed to have assumed the risk of conditions of which he is ignorant,” a standard that “is
subjective and is keyed to what the particular plaintiff in fact sees, knows, understands and
appreciates” (internal quotations omitted)). But see Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123,
1130–31 (La. 1988) (noting that “even as we held that assumption of risk involves a purely
subjective standard and turns on whether the plaintiff actually knew of the risk, we were willing
to impute such knowledge to the plaintiff whenever it could be assumed from the given facts that
he must have known of the danger”).
124. See Eric A. Feldman & Alison Stein, Assuming the Risk: Tort Law, Policy, and Politics
on the Slippery Slope, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 259, 267 (2010).
125. Id. (noting that Hilliard describes the doctrine as holding that “[i]f a defective condition
‘was known to the servant . . . and the servant continued in the service he assumed the risk
himself.’”) (quoting 2 FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS, OR PRIVATE WRONGS 467 (3d ed.
1866)).
126. Id. (quoting FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 181 (2d ed.
1878)).
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controversial both doctrinally and normatively. Murphy v. Steeplechase
Amusement Co. involved a young man who had broken his kneecap on a
Coney Island amusement park ride called “the flopper.”127 In an elegantly
terse but somewhat cryptic opinion by Judge Cardozo, the New York Court
of Appeals held that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of being thrown to the
ground when he stepped onto the ride. He had watched numerous other riders
suffer the same fate and indeed being thrown to the ground against or at least
in the company of a lady friend was in a sense the whole point of the
enterprise.128 “Volenti non fit injuria,”129 Cardozo wrote:
One who takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers that inhere
in it so far as they are obvious and necessary . . . . Visitors were
tumbling about the belt to the merriment of onlookers when he made
his choice to join them. He took the chance of a like fate, with
whatever damage to his body might ensue from such a fall. The
timorous may stay at home.130

Much of the language in Cardozo’s opinion can be read as holding,
contrary to the famous quote above, that the company was not in fact
negligent in designing the ride. The chance of being thrown was part of the
point, and the canvas pads placed to the side of the belt were adequate
provision for riders’ safety. There is thus some confusion as to whether the
opinion is best read as only holding that a plaintiff assumes the risk of an
activity when the risk is in some sense the very point of the activity (and thus
not properly described as stemming from any negligence on the part of the
defendant). This formulation would later be referred to by some courts as
“primary” assumption of risk, with “secondary” assumption of risk being the
more expansive idea that a plaintiff who knowingly and voluntarily
encounters a risk created by the defendant’s negligence is barred from
recovery.131 Regardless of its precise interpretation as a doctrinal matter,
Murphy stands out as an expression of a common moral instinct: a person

127. 166 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1929).
128. See id. at 174. The plaintiff, “a vigorous young man,” was at the park with friends and
had just watched one of them, “a young woman, now his wife,” step onto the belt before him. Id.
When the belt gave a sudden jerk, the whole group was thrown to the floor. Id. Cardozo opines
that “[t]he tumbling bodies and the screams and laughter supplied the merriment and fun.” Id.
129. “To a willing person it is not a wrong,” i.e., “a person is not wronged by that to which
he or she consents.” Volenti non fit injuria, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
130. 166 N.E. at 174.
131. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 703–04 (Cal. 1992).
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who knowingly and voluntarily chooses to expose himself to a risk thereby
accepts responsibility for its realization.132
The perhaps equally famous Holmes opinion in Lamson v. American
Axe133 illustrates well why assumption of risk has long been deeply
controversial. Lamson was an employee of an axe manufacturer who
expressed concern to his employer about the stability of a rack full of hatchets
and the safety of working beneath it.134 The response from Lamson’s boss
was straightforward: “use the racks or leave.”135 Lamson chose not to quit his
job and, as he feared, was injured by a falling hatchet. Holmes’s two
paragraph opinion had no difficulty concluding that Lamson “took the risk”:
“The plaintiff, on his own evidence, appreciated the danger more than anyone
else. He perfectly understood what was likely to happen.”136 The fact that “the
fear of losing his place was one of his motives” in staying was dismissed as
simply irrelevant.137
Lamson shows how assumption of risk became a key member of the socalled “unholy trinity” of tort doctrines that served to block recovery by
workers for workplace injuries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.138 That legacy has made assumption of risk deeply controversial as
a normative matter. By adopting an expansive conception of “choice” and
treating the choices made by plaintiffs from all walks of life and in all
contexts equally, this traditional version of assumption of risk instantiates a
laissez-faire vision of the world that is “rooted in an unattractive libertarian
conception of equality.”139 Many have even seen it as a wholly unprincipled
subsidy to American industry.140 Notably, Holmes’s opinion completely
132. See Feldman & Stein, supra note 124, at 300 (noting the “powerful intuitive appeal to
the idea that individuals who engage in risky activities should bear the costs of their accidents”).
133. Lamson v. Am. Axe & Tool Co., 58 N.E. 585 (Mass. 1900).
134. See id. at 585.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 526–27 (4th ed. 1971); see
also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 470–85 (2d ed. 1985); WITT, supra
note 85, at 43–70.
139. Avihay Dorfman, Assumption of Risk, After All, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 293, 296
(2014).
140. See Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 58–59 (1943) (“Assumption of risk
is a judicially created rule which was developed in response to the general impulse of common
law courts at the beginning of [the industrial revolution] to insulate the employer as much as
possible from bearing the ‘human overhead’ which is an inevitable part of the cost—to
someone—of the doing of industrialized business. The general purpose behind this development
in the common law seems to have been to give maximum freedom to expanding industry.”); id.
at 69 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[T]he phrase ‘assumption of risk’ gave judicial expression to
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elides the economic context in which Lamson’s choice to keep his job was
made. For Holmes, the choice to remain in a job was no different from the
choice to step onto a frivolous ride like the flopper. By treating the choices
of everyone in every context as equal doctrinally, assumption of risk
ironically “betray[ed] the basic commitment to the equal concern and respect
for persons” that is, at least today, usually taken as basic to both tort law and
our legal system more broadly.141
Perhaps motivated by the idea that assumption of risk “threatens too much
libertarianism and too little fairness” (which Avihay Dorfman calls “the deep
source of the hostility toward the assumption of risk doctrine”),142 scholars
and judges have long sought to abolish assumption of risk on doctrinal
grounds as well. One version of this effort focuses on the ways in which
assumption of risk analysis often feels suspiciously like a substitute for ideas
concerning duty or breach or comparative negligence. Assumption of risk can
thus be seen as redundant; instead of saying the plaintiff assumed the risk and
therefore loses, this critique says, we should be saying that the defendant
lacked a duty to prevent this particular harm, or that the defendant’s behavior
did not breach a duty he owed the plaintiff, or that the plaintiff was actually
negligent in exposing himself to the risk.
The problem, on this view, is not just that it is unnecessary to talk about
assumption of risk, but rather that talking about it distracts us from the real
issues.143 For example, did the Steeplechase Amusement Park in fact operate
a dangerous ride, or was Murphy’s accident best characterized as a freak
occurrence not traceable to any breach on the part of the defendant? If the
problem is that amusement park rides should be reasonably safe, then talking
about whether Murphy assumed the risk begins to look like a distraction.
Modern conventional wisdom among torts scholars holds that assumption of
a social policy that entailed much human misery.”); Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 515 P.2d 821,
823 (Wash. 1973) (tracing assumption of risk to “[j]udicial protectivism of industrial growth” and
noting that “[j]udicial recognition that industry should not be nurtured at the expense of human
suffering was not forthcoming until relatively recently”).
141. Dorfman, supra note 139, at 309. Even Francis Bohlen, an early booster of the
assumption of risk doctrine, sounded a note of caution about its ability to “impose an intolerable
subjection to fortuitous advantages of superior physical, social, and economic position,” which
could be “abused to obtain the mere form of consent while the substance of real volition is absent.”
Francis H. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARV. L. REV. 14, 21–22 (1906).
Nevertheless, Bohlen insisted that “the common law makes no pretence of being a social reformer,
and does not profess to reduce all persons to an absolutely equal position by eliminating natural
advantages.” Id. at 22.
142. Dorfman, supra note 139, at 308.
143. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, The Monsanto Lecture: Assumption of Risk, 31 VAL.
U. L. REV. 833 (1997).
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risk should be abolished as a distinct doctrine and assimilated within
comparative fault.144 The Third Restatement of Torts favors this approach as
well, suggesting that the plaintiff’s choice to encounter a risk should be
treated as relevant only to the question of breach.145
And yet, assumption of risk remains “firmly embedded in tort law.”146 In
part there is a narrow doctrinal explanation. There is, technically at least, a
meaningful distinction between holding that an individual plaintiff
subjectively appreciated a risk and chose to expose herself to it and a holding
that relies on notions of duty or reasonable care.147 Indeed, many courts
applying the doctrine of assumption of risk interpret the subjective
knowledge requirement quite strictly, rejecting arguments that plaintiffs
ought to have known of the risk that led to their injury.148 Some courts
considering the impact of the move from contributory to comparative
negligence on assumption of risk have thus concluded that assumption of risk
should continue to operate as a complete bar to a plaintiff’s recovery.149
144. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 153 (2d ed.
2002); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 534–46 (2000); FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW
OF TORTS § 21.8 (2d ed. 1986); Fleming James Jr., Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952);
Sugarman, supra note 143; John W. Wade, The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of
Negligence, 22 LA. L. REV. 5, 14 (1961).
145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3 cmt. c (AM. LAW
INST. 2000).
146. Feldman & Stein, supra note 124, at 302.
147. See PROSSER, supra note 138, § 68 (insisting that assumption of risk “is a distinctive
kind of contributory negligence . . . governed by the subjective standard of the plaintiff himself
[and not] the objective standard of the reasonable man”); Dorfman, supra note 139, at 300; see
also Poole v. Coakley & Williams Constr., Inc., 31 A.3d 212 (Md. 2011) (distinguishing
assumption of risk from contributory negligence).
148. See, e.g., Poole, 31 A.3d at 228 (rejecting argument that risk of slipping on black ice
was obvious to plaintiff crossing a visibly icy parking lot); Hughes v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist.,
735 N.W.2d 793, 810–11 (Neb. 2007) (holding that reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff
who was cutting through conduit in an area marked as containing buried electrical lines did not
have actual knowledge of the danger associated with the particular excavation site in question);
Pliess v. Barnes, 619 N.W.2d 825, 829–30 (Neb. 2000) (holding that the plaintiff’s admitted
appreciation of the general risk that ladders could “get shaky and fall down” not sufficient to show
assumption of risk that aluminum ladder could slide when placed against aluminum gutter);
Vaughn v. Pleasent, 471 S.E.2d 866, 869 (Ga. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff, a police officer
engaged in a high-speed pursuit who sped through an intersection in the wrong lane, did not
thereby assume the risk of a collision. While plaintiff was aware of the general risk of speeding
through intersections, he was not aware of the specific risk created when defendant, pulling a
trailer with non-functioning lights, made an unexpected left turn.).
149. See, e.g., Smollett v. Skayting Dev. Corp., 793 F.2d 547, 548 (3d Cir. 1986); Kennedy
v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 376 A.2d 329 (R.I. 1977). Other jurisdictions have adopted a
contrary rule. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975); McConville v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 113 N.W.2d 14 (Wis. 1962).
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Assumption of risk has also been narrowed significantly since the days of
Lamson. Today, courts are much more willing to treat as not sufficiently
“voluntary” choices like the decision to remain in a job.150
These narrow doctrinal explanations, however, hint at a broader, more
significant truth: assumption of risk is popular. Contrary to the views of many
legal scholars and jurists, assumption of risk contains at its core an idea that
has appealing normative meaning independent of concepts of duty and
breach.151 Pitched at its highest level of generalization, assumption of risk
expresses in doctrine the commonsense idea that someone who knowingly
and freely exposes himself to a risk cannot then complain when that risk is
realized.152 Framed this way, assumption of risk survives even in jurisdictions
that have abolished it as a total bar to a plaintiff’s recovery; even under the
Third Restatement approach, for example, a defendant may still argue that
the plaintiff’s knowing and freely made choice to encounter a risk diminishes
the defendant’s own responsibility for the plaintiff’s injury, either because
the plaintiff’s decision was itself negligent or because it renders the
defendant’s behavior less so.153
Nor is assumption of risk the only tort doctrine that hinges on concepts of
knowledge and choice. Consent, for example, is an affirmative defense to a
broad range of intentional torts, from battery to trespass to false
imprisonment.154 Like assumption of risk, consent is built on ideas about
individuals’ right to autonomy.155 Consent is thus inherently subjective; it is
irrelevant whether a reasonable person would have consented in similar
150. See Siragusa v. Swedish Hospital, 373 P.2d 767, 773 (Wash. 1962) (“To bar recovery
when the employee is acting reasonably in exposing himself to a known and appreciated risk is
to indulge in the unrealistic and rigid presumption that, in so exposing himself, the employee
‘assents’ to relieve his employer from his responsibility to furnish a safe place in which to work.
Such a presumption has no basis in experience, and is not founded upon any current social
policy.”); Kenneth W. Simmons, Reflections on Assumption of Risk, 50 UCLA L. REV. 481, 485
(2002).
151. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Shielding Duty: How Attending to
Assumption of Risk, Attractive Nuisance, and Other “Quaint” Doctrines Can Improve
Decisionmaking in Negligence Cases, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 329 (2006); Simmons, supra note 150,
at 481, 528.
152. See Feldman & Stein, supra note 124, at 300–02 (noting that assumption of risk “has
withstood decades of criticism because of its resonance with society”).
153. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3 cmt. c (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (“Abandoning implied assumption of risk as a defense does not mean that a plaintiff’s
actual knowledge of or voluntary decision to encounter a risk is irrelevant to apportioning
liability.”).
154. DOBBS, supra note 144, § 105.
155. Id. (noting that consent “makes the plaintiff’s right of self-determination or autonomy
the centerpiece of the law on intentional torts and to some extent other torts as well”).
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circumstances.156 Consent is also ineffective to bar recovery if it is based on
a mistake (for example as a result of a misrepresentation by the defendant)157
or obtained by duress (for example through an employer’s abuse of his
position of power of an employee).158 These concepts are analogous to
assumption of risk’s focus on knowledge and choice. In both cases tort law
respects the exercise of an individual’s free will to the extent that it is based
on an accurate understanding of the factual circumstances and is not coerced.
In addition to surviving as a tort doctrine (and being given effect by
countless jury decisions), assumption of risk crops up as an argument in
numerous policy debates outside the realm of tort law. In contexts ranging
from obesity159 to tobacco160 to the perils of a career playing professional
football,161 the argument is often made that people should be afforded the
freedom to expose themselves to various risks, and to live with the
consequences. The ubiquity of this argument is a sign of its power, and it
behooves those who are skeptical of it to take it seriously.162
III.

KNOWLEDGE

For a choice to live somewhere to be a morally significant factor in
evaluating one’s responsibility for the risks one faces there, that choice must
be made knowingly, with some particularized awareness of the risk. While
the current discourse surrounding reform of the NFIP frequently assumes that
people know the risk of flooding they face, a closer examination reveals that
this assumption is largely false. Knowledge of risk results from (1) scientific
understanding of the risk; (2) communication of the scientific understanding
to individuals; and (3) comprehension on the part of individuals. There are,
in many cases, nearly insurmountable obstacles at each stage of this process.
156. On the other hand, a plaintiff can consent by words or acts the defendant reasonably
interpreted to manifest consent, even if the plaintiff did not subjectively intend to consent. Id.
§ 105.
157. Id. § 112.
158. Id. § 113.
159. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, What (Not) To Do About Obesity: A Moderate Aristotelian
Answer, 93 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1361–62 (2005).
160. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case
for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1183–86, 1319 (1998) (noting
prominence of assumption of risk argument in debate over tobacco regulation).
161. See, e.g., Mikayla Paolini, Comment, NFL Takes a Page from the Big Tobacco
Playbook: Assumption of Risk in the CTE Crisis, 68 EMORY L.J. 607, 628–30 (2019).
162. Dorfman, supra note 139, at 310–11 (“The challenge for those seeking to invoke the
law to make our society healthier and safer for all is to engage, rather than dismiss or ignore, the
conservative instinct for the assumption of risk (moral) principle and (legal) doctrine.”).
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A. The Science of Flood Risk
To understand the risk of flood faced by an individual parcel of land is an
enormously complicated undertaking. It is worth remembering that one
reason private insurers stopped offering flood insurance in the mid twentieth
century was that they were simply unable to adequately model the risk.163
Although the science of hydrology has made enormous progress, scientists
continue to work to refine their understanding of how a myriad of factors
come together to affect the flood risk in any particular location, and how those
factors might change in the future.
A flood is a combination of water and land, and predicting one requires a
sophisticated understanding of each. The water that creates a flood can come
from intense rainfall, coastal storm surge, a river overtopping its banks, or
any combination of these. How that water impacts the land in question can
also be determined by a range of factors, including soil composition, local
topography, development patterns, and the design of any home that is
affected. Processing all of these factors requires gathering large volumes of
accurate data, which has proved to be a significant challenge.164
Flood risk is very much a moving target; each of these factors is subject
to change, often with devastating effects. In May of 2018, Ellicott City,
Maryland, was hit by devastating flooding. Thanks to videos taken and posted
to social media by terrified residents watching from second story windows as
their downtown turned into a roiling river of brown floodwater, the event
briefly captured widespread attention.165 To locals, the flood was notable not
just for its magnitude, but because it was the second 1,000-year flood (a flood
with a 0.1% chance of occurring in any given year) in three years.166 Ellicott
City is an old mill town. It was founded in 1772 and has flooded over a dozen
163. See Pasterick, supra note 29, at 128; Scales, supra note 13, at 8.
164. See Alexandra Witze, Attack of the Extreme Floods, NATURE (Mar. 7, 2018),
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-02745-0
[https://perma.cc/AS9M-T2WW]
(describing efforts by scientists to gather data on flood risk, including need to manually collect
and digitize documents that predate the start of modern NOAA records in 1921); see also Maggie
Koerth-Baker, It’s Time To Ditch the Concept of ‘100-Year Floods,’ FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 30,
2017),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/its-time-to-ditch-the-concept-of-100-year-floods/
[https://perma.cc/N8TM-22DV] (noting that much of the stream gauge data on which estimates
of Houston’s flood risk is based only goes back a few decades).
165. See Henry Grabar, The Maryland Flooding Is a Warning: Climate Change Is Hitting
America as Rain, and We’re Making It Worse, SLATE (May 29, 2018), https://slate.com/newsand-politics/2018/05/ellicott-city-maryland-flooding-climate-change-is-coming-as-rain.html
[https://perma.cc/J4XW-ARLQ].
166. Id. That this is startling is, in part, a perfect illustration of the problem of describing
flood events by their “return interval,” which tends to create an impression that a 1,000-year flood
should happen only once in 1,000 years.

198

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

times since then. The source of its floodwaters has historically been the
Patapsco River, which flows into Baltimore and forms its harbor. The flood
events of 2016 and 2018, however, resulted from flash floods on the Tiber
River, a small tributary of the Patapsco that flows through Ellicott City. The
surrounding area has seen widespread development in recent years, which
has covered absorbent soil with asphalt and created a flash flooding problem
that most agree is new.167
The flooding in Ellicott City points to another significant challenge in the
scientific understanding of flood risk: the role of climate change. Ellicott
City’s flooding was caused by a brief but intense period of rainfall, one of
several sources of flooding that climate change is expected to exacerbate.
Warmer air holds more moisture, which can cause heavier rainfall. The
number of extreme precipitation events in the United States has been well
above average for the past three decades, a trend that is expected to
continue.168 Understanding how these broad trends apply to any given place
in the United States is much more challenging. The first volume of the Fourth
National Climate Assessment notes that the observed national increase in
extreme precipitation masks significant regional and seasonal variations: the
Pacific Northwest has seen a slight decrease in extreme rainfall, while the
eastern half of the country has seen large increases.169 Projecting these trends
into the future, the Climate Assessment notes, is “much more difficult.”170
While the global mechanisms are fairly well understood, how they will play
out in a particular region is a matter of uncertainty.171 The degree of
uncertainty is worth emphasizing. How much increase in extreme
precipitation events is expected over the coming century depends on trends
in carbon emissions during that period, itself a matter of significant
uncertainty.172 If carbon emissions continue to increase, the number of
extreme rainfall events in the United States could increase by anywhere from

167. See id.; Luke Broadwater, Scott Dance & Pamela Wood, After Deadly Flash Flood,
Concern About Development’s Impact on Ellicott City, BALT. SUN (Aug. 13, 2016),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/howard/ellicott-city/bs-md-ho-ellicott-citydevelopment-20160813-story.html [https://perma.cc/A36J-A9XR]. Nowhere is this dynamic
more pronounced than in Houston. Satija, Collier & Shaw, supra note 5.
168. 1 U.S. GLOB. CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL
REPORT: THE FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 210, 216 (Donald J. Wuebbles, David
W. Fahey & Kathy W. Hibbard eds., 2017), https://science2017.globalchange.gov/downloads/
CSSR2017_FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB69-K6MS].
169. Id. at 210–13.
170. Id. at 216.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 14, 218.
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100 to 200%.173 Under a lower emissions scenario, increases could be
between 50 and 100%, again with significant regional variation.174
A far more significant way in which climate change will increase flood
risk is sea level rise. A higher global sea level will worsen periodic flooding
from storm surges, so-called “nuisance” flooding that occurs during high
tides, and finally, in some areas, lead to complete inundation. Rising sea
levels are frequently assumed to present an obvious and unmistakable risk for
those in coastal areas, but here again the risk is characterized by complexity
and variability that makes its application to individual properties challenging.
The scientific understanding of how rising sea levels will affect flood risk
must start with a basic question: how much will global sea levels increase?
Translating degrees of warming in the earth’s climate into increases in global
mean sea level requires starting with assumptions about how much warming
will occur. The national climate assessment bases its analysis on the amount
of warming that will occur by 2100 under four possible scenarios: a
pessimistic scenario in which emissions continue at current rates, and three
more optimistic scenarios that assume varying degrees of reduction in
emissions at various times.175 Under these scenarios, which were generated
for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, warming could range
from as little as 0.6 to 2.4 degrees Celsius under the lowest scenario to as
much as 2.8 to 5.7 degrees Celsius under the highest scenario.176
These ranges translate into similarly broad ranges of possible increases in
global sea levels.177 The fourth national climate assessment predicts that
global mean sea level will rise by at least a foot by 2100, and goes on to note
that under a high emissions scenario, global sea levels could rise by as much
as eight feet, but that “the probability of such an extreme outcome cannot
currently be assessed.”178
Increases in global mean sea level do not translate into uniform increases
in regional sea levels. Regional sea level is affected by a range of factors,

173. Id. at 218.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 16.
176. Id. These estimates have generated intense debate. Many scientists believe they are too
low. The former chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Robert Watson, has
said that warming of three degrees should be considered the “realistic minimum.” Nathaniel Rich,
Losing Earth: The Decade We Almost Stopped Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2018),
https://nyti.ms/2mWMDT8 [https://perma.cc/4CFT-JUAN].
177. See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 112, at 11 (“The difference in
impacts to real estate between high and low sea level rise scenarios is stark.”).
178. U.S. GLOB. CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 168, at 333.

200

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

including global ocean currents and land subsidence.179 While this introduces
further uncertainty into localized predictions (for example, the Gulf Stream
has been weakening and could collapse entirely, significantly worsening sea
level rise along the East Coast),180 it is so far clear that much of the east and
Gulf coasts of the United States will experience sea level rise worse than
global averages.181 Indeed, this trend has already begun and has been
observed in local data.182
Such is the current state of scientific understanding of how climate change
will affect flood risk in the United States.183 It will certainly worsen the risk
of flooding in most areas, but to highly varying degrees depending on factors
ranging from global efforts to curb carbon emissions to local groundwater
extraction and land use patterns.
B. FEMA’s Understanding of Flood Risk
FEMA’s understanding of flood risk is what matters for purposes of the
NFIP, and it diverges from what might be called the best scientific
understanding in a variety of ways. First and perhaps most glaringly, FEMA’s
estimates of flood risk are exclusively backwards-looking. In other words,
FEMA does not account for projections of future increases in rainfall or sea
level in evaluating flood risk. It also doesn’t factor in future land subsidence
or development. In FEMA’s most recent report to Congress, this is listed as
a long term, “10+ year[]” goal.184 FEMA is also cautious about incorporating
new data and new modelling techniques into its assessments of flood risk,
which inevitably leaves it trailing behind the latest science. One recent study,
179. Id. at 335. In some areas, the earth’s crust is still moving upwards (“rebounding”) after
being relieved of the weight of the ice sheets that rested on it during the last ice age. In other
areas, land deposited by glaciers is still subsiding.
180. Id. at 335, 346.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 347.
183. In emphasizing the uncertainty in scientific projections of flood risk, I do not wish to
deny or even downplay the significance of the risks involved, or, obviously, the degree to which
human activity has contributed to those risks and the desirability of efforts to address them. My
point is that the current scientific understanding of how climate change will affect flood risk is
phrased in terms of ranges of possibilities that apply to vast regions of the country, which makes
the task of understanding how an individual property’s flood risk will change over the coming
century necessarily imprecise.
184. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., FEMA REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE TECHNICAL MAPPING
ADVISORY COUNCIL’S RECOMMENDATIONS FROM 2015, at 17 (2017), https://www.fema.gov/
media-library-data/1510597855001-1e4586a3b443a444399889cdd205663c/FEMA_
Adminsitrator_Report_to_Congress_(June_9_2017)_TMAC_Recomm.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8KRQ-5PLV].
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for example, noted that FEMA assesses the risk of freshwater and saltwater
flooding as entirely independent variables, when in fact they often appear
together, as happens during hurricanes.185
Perhaps even more significantly, FEMA’s flood maps are appallingly old,
and out of date even by its own internal yardstick. Keeping detailed flood
maps of the entire country up to date has been a challenge that has bedeviled
FEMA for years. In the National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994,
Congress required FEMA to assess each of its flood maps every five years
and determine whether each map is in need of revision. In 2009, FEMA set
itself a goal ensuring that 80% of its maps were either revised and updated or
determined to be accurate by 2014. Instead only 49% of its maps met this
standard by 2014. A 2017 report by the Department of Homeland Security’s
Inspector General revealed that by the end of December 2016, only 42% of
FEMA’s maps were up to date.186
In many parts of the country, including parts that are at high risk of
flooding, maps are decades old.187 Beaufort and Hilton Head, South Carolina,
have not had new flood maps since 1986. Parts of the Texas Gulf Coast near
Houston and Galveston have not had new maps since the early 1990s.188
Atlantic City, New Jersey, which is already experiencing regular nuisance
flooding due to rising sea levels,189 has not had a new flood map since 1985.190
In many areas the difference between old and new maps is significant: flood
maps for Jackson County, Mississippi, (along the Gulf Coast) show water
depths during a 100-year flood as much as fourteen feet higher than older
185. See Jen Schwartz, National Flood Insurance Program Is Underwater Because of
Outdated Science, SCI. AM. (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
national-flood-insurance-is-underwater-because-of-outdated-science [https://perma.cc/W9RLSAHB].
186. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-17-110, FEMA
NEEDS TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF ITS FLOOD MAPPING PROGRAMS 3 (2017),
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/OIG-17-110-Sep17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F2XN-XDF4].
187. See Michael Keller et al., Outdated and Unreliable: FEMA’s Faulty Flood Maps Put
Homeowners at Risk, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017fema-faulty-flood-maps
[https://web.archive.org/web/20190119221018/https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017fema-faulty-flood-maps/].
188. Id.
189. Michael Edison Hayden, Atlantic City Gambles on Rising Seas, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC
(May 4, 2016), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/05/160502-rising-seas-climate-changeatlantic-city [https://perma.cc/C95N-KVJ4].
190. FEMA Flood Map Service Center for Atlantic City, New Jersey, FEMA,
https://msc.fema.gov/portal/search (search in search bar for “Atlantic City, New Jersey”) (last
visited Mar. 3, 2019).
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maps in neighboring Mobile County, Alabama.191 The problem is not just
inaccurate depth; new maps might also show thousands of properties at risk
of flooding for the first time.192
FEMA’s outdated approach to the science of flood risk and inability to
keep its maps current have resulted in a significant underestimation of the
risk of flooding in many areas. Anecdotally, it has become commonplace to
hear of virtually back-to-back occurrences of floods with 500- or 1,000-year
return intervals.193 One study examined properties that had flooded repeatedly
in Houston during the 30-year period from 1978 to 2008 and found that
almost half of them—47%—were located outside the 100-year flood zone.194
Large scale national evaluations have lent further support to the idea that
FEMA’s maps understate the risk. One recent study used newer, higherresolution data to evaluate from scratch the risk of flooding caused by rainfall
in the contiguous United States. The authors found that FEMA’s maps
significantly underestimate the risk: FEMA’s maps show thirteen million
Americans living in 100-year flood zones, while the authors’ analysis
suggests the number should be 40.8 million.195 There were similarly large
discrepancies in the total property value at risk, and the authors projected—
using estimates of population growth but not the effects of climate change—
that the problem is getting worse.196
C. Communicating Flood Risk
For individuals to have meaningful knowledge of the flood risk they face,
the scientific and regulatory understanding of that risk (such as it is) must be
191. Keller et al., supra note 187.
192. Id. In many cases, being re-mapped into a flood zone means being subject to the NFIP’s
purchase mandate for the first time, creating a financial burden that generates intense local
opposition to new flood maps. See Pralle, supra note 121, at 15.
193. In Houston, for example, the “Tax Day” and “Memorial Day” floods of 2016 and
Hurricane Harvey in 2017 all featured rainfall currently estimated to have only a 0.2% chance of
occurring in any given year (a so-called “500-year” event). Spring Floods 2016, HARRIS COUNTY
FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.hcfcd.org/flooding-floodplains/stormcenter/spring-floods-2016 [https://perma.cc/S2Y7-R7ZK]; Memorandum from Jeff Linder, Dir.
Hydrologic Operations/Meteorologist, to Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist. Flood Watch/Partners 3
(June 4, 2018), https://www.hcfcd.org/media/2678/immediate-flood-report-final-hurricaneharvey-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9GH-98DX].
194. Wesley E. Highfield, Sarah A. Norman & Samuel D. Brody, Examining the 100-Year
Floodplain as a Metric of Risk, Loss, and Household Adjustment, 33 RISK ANALYSIS 186, 189
(2012).
195. Oliver E.J. Wing et al., Estimates of Present and Future Flood Risk in the Conterminous
United States, 13 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 3 (2018).
196. Id. at 5.
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available to them in some way. The primary mechanism by which flood risk
is communicated is through FEMA’s maps, and the job they do is poor.
Much of the information in FEMA’s maps (known as “Flood Insurance
Rate Maps” or “FIRMs”) is built on the statistical construct known as a 100year flood.197 Within the 100-year flood zone (known as the “Special Flood
Hazard Area”), FIRMs show the expected depth of the water above
surrounding grade (the “base flood elevation”).198 FIRMs also show which
areas are expected to flood during 500-year events, but not the depth of water
during such episodes.199 They do not show the effects of more severe (and
therefore less likely) events. In coastal areas, FIRMs also depict areas that are
expected to be subject to wave action during floods, which is potentially far
more destructive.200 The Special Flood Hazard Area is the most important
designation in a FIRM: within it, the NFIP’s purchase mandate applies, as do
local building codes that require new and substantially damaged homes to be
built above base flood elevation.201
The concept of the 100-year flood has long been the subject of intense
criticism.202 Even setting aside issues surrounding the accuracy of FEMA’s
determinations of what constitutes a 100-year flood, there are problems with
relying on such a construct in the first place. For those within the 100-year
flood zone, the term creates the misimpression that floods should happen only
once every 100 years, and that the occurrence of one means that the next is
99 years away.203 FEMA has for many years battled valiantly to combat this
197. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, TECHNICAL FACT SHEET NO. 3, USING A FLOOD
INSURANCE RATE MAP (FIRM): HOME BUILDER’S GUIDE TO COASTAL CONSTRUCTION 1
http://www.flash.org/resources/files/HGCC_Fact03.pdf [https://perma.cc/65F8-759L].
198. FEMA Flood Map Service Center: FAQs, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
https://msc.fema.gov/portal/resources/faq [https://perma.cc/UW6Z-9FTS] (last visited Jan. 25,
2019).
199. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, HOW TO READ A FLOOD INSURANCE RATE MAP
TUTORIAL
(2003)
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1550-20490-1950/
ot_firm.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WYX-NMBV].
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See, e.g., Highfield, Norman & Brody, supra note 194, at 186 (“[T]he 100-year
floodplain is neither accurate nor sufficient in guiding communities and household decisions to
mitigate the adverse economic impacts of floods.”); Koerth-Baker, supra note 164 (calling the
100-year flood “one of the most misunderstood terms in disaster preparedness”).
203. See, e.g., Scales, supra note 13, at 9 (“What the average person actually
understands . . . is that once there has already been such a flood in his area, he is safe for the next
ninety-nine years.”); see also Nadja Popovich & Claire O’Neill, A ‘500-Year Flood’ Could
Happen Again Sooner Than You Think. Here’s Why, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2vEVM4y [https://perma.cc/459R-P3NC] (noting tweet from Donald Trump
referring to Harvey as “a once in 500 year flood”).
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misimpression (preferring now to speak of the 26% chance of a flood
occurring over the course of a 30-year mortgage, for example), but it persists.
One of the many cognitive biases affecting perception of flood risk is the
belief that long-term averages will be replicated in short samples of data. So,
for example, people significantly underestimate the odds of getting heads
four times in a row when flipping a coin or, having been told that a flood was
caused by a 100-year storm, the odds that it will happen again the following
year.204
For those outside the 100-year floodplain, the problems with the construct
are more severe. Being outside the Special Flood Hazard Area and therefore
not obligated to purchase flood insurance is understood by many as meaning
that flood risk is not a significant problem.205 More than half the homes
damaged by Hurricane Harvey—more than 100,000 in number—were
outside of all floodplain designations.206 To many who lived outside FEMAdesignated floodplains and yet were flooded by Harvey, the fact that their
homes were capable of being flooded came as a shock.207 In the Houston
suburb The Woodlands, the bright lines demarcating NFIP flood zones
incentivized gamesmanship, with developers trucking in tens of thousands of
cubic yards of dirt to build homes that were literally inches above base flood
elevation and thus not required to buy flood insurance, most of which flooded
during Harvey.208 Notably, although Harvey was an unprecedented storm in
many respects,209 it was not unique in the recent history of the Houston area.
204. Robert J. Meyer, Why We Under-Prepare for Hazards, in ON RISK AND DISASTER:
LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA, 153, 160 (Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F. Kettl & Howard
Kunreuther eds., 2006).
205. See CTR. FOR DISASTER RESILIENCE, UNIV. OF MD. & CTR. FOR TEX. BEACHES &
SHORES, TEX. A&M UNIV., THE GROWING THREAT OF URBAN FLOODING: A NATIONAL
CHALLENGE 35 (2018) [hereinafter URBAN FLOODING], https://cdr.umd.edu/sites/cdr.umd.edu/
files/urban-flooding-report-online-revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4LV-YG4L] (noting that
FIRMs “have . . . been incorrectly seen as tools to communicate basic flood risk—property is
subject to flooding (in the SFHA) or not (outside the SFHA)”).
206. David Hunn et al., Harvey’s Floods: Most Homes Damaged by Harvey Were Outside
Flood Plain, Data Show, HOUS. CHRON. (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/
news/article/In-Harvey-s-deluge-most-damaged-homes-were-12794820.php
[https://perma.cc/K9DD-2DNV].
207. Id.
208. John Schwartz, James Glanz & Andrew W. Lehren, Builders Said Their Homes Were
Out of a Flood Zone. Then Harvey Came, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2BCdrON
[https://perma.cc/DN4S-JNVF].
209. The National Weather Service called Harvey “the most significant tropical cyclone
rainfall event in . . . United States history since reliable rainfall records began in the 1880s.”
Donovan Landreneau, Hurricane Harvey, NAT’L WEATHER SERV., https://www.weather.gov/lch/
2017harvey [https://perma.cc/6K4Y-LHDJ] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).

51:0163]

ASSUMPTION OF FLOOD RISK

205

Harvey set flood records in only thirteen of Harris County’s twenty-two
watersheds, several of which experienced higher water levels during Tropical
Storm Allison in 2001.210 The Tax Day floods in 2016 saw a similar pattern:
more than half the structures damaged were outside the 100-year
floodplain.211
Using the 100-year flood zone as the fulcrum of the NFIP implies a bright
line between those at risk and those who need not worry about flooding, and
this bright line is reflected in NFIP participation rates. Participation rates in
the NFIP have always been disappointing, in part because the program’s
purchase mandate is woefully underenforced.212 Relatively few of those
living outside FEMA’s 100-year floodplain choose to purchase flood
insurance.213 Nationally, the NFIP’s market penetration outside Special Flood
Hazard Areas has been estimated at 1%.214 It is hard to know how many of
those households should purchase flood insurance, given the wide range of
flood risk that can be found in areas outside FEMA-designated Special Flood
Hazard Areas. Comparing the number of NFIP policies in effect with
independent estimates of the number of households at risk of flooding gives
some sense of the problem. According to one study, which found that
FEMA’s 100-year flood zones were far too small, there are 15.4 million
homes located in 100-year flood zones across the country,215 while there are
only about 4.8 million flood insurance policies for residential properties
currently in force.216
More anecdotally, virtually every significant flood is followed by the
revelation that only a relatively small percentage of those flooded were
insured. In Harris County, which has 1.7 million housing units, there were
just 249,000 flood insurance policies in place before Harvey; it has been
210. See Zach Despart, Funding Gap Post-Harvey Shows Need for Better Flood Maps, HOUS.
CHRON. (June 7, 2018), https://www.pressreader.com/usa/houston-chronicle/20180607/
281573766389961; Memorandum from Jeff Linder, supra note 193, at 4–7.
211. Hunn et al., supra note 206.
212. Enforcement of the purchase mandate is not FEMA’s responsibility; rather, it is left up
to the regulator with oversight of the lender in question. Compliance with the lender mandate has
been estimated at between 75 and 80% nationally, with significant local variation. LLOYD DIXON
ET AL., RAND CORP., THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM’S MARKET PENETRATION
RATE: ESTIMATES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS, at xvii, 2 n.5 (2006), https://www.fema.gov/medialibrary-data/20130726-1602-20490-2804/nfip_eval_market_penetration_rate.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MBJ3-D2FB].
213. Id. at xviii.
214. Id. at xvi.
215. Wing et al., supra note 195, at 5.
216. Policies in Force by Occupancy Type, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
https://www.fema.gov/policies-force-occupancy-type
[https://perma.cc/X6ZZ-A9S9]
(last
visited Mar. 4, 2019).
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estimated that about 70% of the residential flood damage caused by Harvey
was not covered by insurance.217 Similar figures emerged in various parts of
the Gulf Coast that were devastated by Hurricane Katrina.218 Only 20% of
those flooded by Hurricane Sandy had flood insurance.219 Of the 57,923
households that suffered the worst categories of damage in flooding caused
by extreme rainfall in Louisiana in 2016, only 37% had flood insurance.220 At
least part of the blame for this state of affairs lies in the fact that many simply
do not know that they are at risk of being flooded.
Various empirical studies have attempted to measure more directly what
people understand about their risk of flooding. They have commonly found
that people, when asked, did not know that they lived in flood-prone areas.221
One study found that most people (64%) were unable to locate their own
homes on maps showing hurricane risk areas.222 In another, researchers
interviewed people living in the paths of Hurricanes Sandy and Isaac in the
days and hours before those storms made landfall.223 The study’s authors
217. Leslie Scism & Nicole Friedman, Houston Residents Return Home to Scary Reality: No
ST.
J.
(Sept.
1,
2017,
8:32
PM),
Insurance
Coverage,
WALL
https://www.wsj.com/articles/houston-residents-return-home-to-scary-reality-no-insurancecoverage-1504300222 [https://perma.cc/M4QY-PF7W]; see also Nicole Friedman & Leslie
Scism, As Hurricane Season Arrives, U.S. Homeowners Haven’t Fixed Their Big Underinsurance
Problem, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2018, 6:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/americanhomeowners-still-have-a-big-underinsurance-problem-1531922482
[https://perma.cc/XQ75AHUK].
218. Along the Gulf Coast of Mississippi, which was virtually wiped out by storm surges,
less than 10% of homes had flood insurance. Scales, supra note 13, at 15. In St. Bernard Parish,
57.7% of homes had flood insurance. Robert H. Jerry, II & Steven E. Roberts, Regulating the
Business of Insurance: Federalism in an Age of Difficult Risk, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 835, 877
(2006). In Orleans Parish, only 40% of homes had flood insurance. Id.
219. David W. Chen, In New York, Drawing Flood Maps Is a ‘Game of Inches,’ N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 7, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2EkURv7 [https://perma.cc/6CRM-NUQT].
220. Bryn Stole, How Much Damage Did the August 2016 Flood Do? Data Becomes Clearer,
(Aug.
7,
2017,
6:56
PM),
but
Gaps
Remain,
ADVOCATE
https://www.theadvocate.com/louisiana_flood_2016/article_66d26396-7974-11e7-ba4183143d6dfef1.html [https://perma.cc/RDR7-WHB2].
221. URBAN FLOODING, supra note 205, at 34 (“A majority of residents in urban flood-prone
areas generally do not understand the actual risks . . . that they face from urban flooding. . . .
Numerous federal reports over the last decade have indicated that miscommunication is a
significant challenge in all types of flooding.”).
222. Sudha Arlikatti et al., Risk Area Accuracy and Hurricane Evacuation Expectations of
Coastal Residents, 38 ENV’T & BEHAV. 226, 239 (2006).
223. See Robert J. Meyer et al., The Dynamics of Hurricane Risk Perception: Real-Time
Evidence from the 2012 Atlantic Hurricane Season, 95 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y
1389, 1390 (2014). There is a rich body of literature examining communication of risk
surrounding shorter term events, like hurricanes. That literature has tended to highlight the
shortcomings of the way we communicate about the risks of coming storms, and particularly the

51:0163]

ASSUMPTION OF FLOOD RISK

207

noted that respondents displayed a prominent bias in favor of wind risk and
against flood risk, consistently underestimating the threat posed by storm
surge and flooding.224
What of those who have already been flooded? Surely the experience of
seeing one’s house underwater creates the requisite knowledge that one is
facing some quantum of flood risk.225 Indeed, so-called “repetitive loss
properties,” a category FEMA defines as those that have had two or more
claims of $10,000 or more in ten years, have become a poster child for
irresponsibility.226 Egregious examples make frequent appearances in the
popular press.227 By eliminating certain rates and imposing new adaptation
requirements on homes that are more than 50% damaged in a flood, the NFIP
does treat the experience of being flooded as a significant turning point. And
apparent failure of risk communications to motivate people to take relatively simple precautions
like evacuating in the face of a storm or installing storm shutters over their windows.
224. Id. at 1394. Notably, the study also found that while 42% of respondents indicated that
they had flood insurance, only 51% said they had a separate flood insurance policy, indicating
that fully half of respondents who thought they had flood insurance were not in fact covered. Id.
at 1400. Similar problems have been observed in other areas. LLOYD DIXON ET AL., RAND CORP.,
THE COST AND AFFORDABILITY OF FLOOD INSURANCE IN NEW YORK CITY 18 (2017),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1776.html
[https://perma.cc/6TYK-GKMX]
(finding in a survey of New Yorkers post-Sandy, that 16% of homeowners believed they had
flood insurance but did not).
225. See Caroline Kelly, Hensarling to Flood Victims: ‘At Some Point, God’s Telling You to
Move,’ DALL. MORNING NEWS (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/
harvey/2017/09/21/hensarling-flood-victims-point-gods-telling-move [https://perma.cc/HHV6FDWP] (reporting remarks of Congressman Jeb Hensarling).
226. In 2004, John Stossel, a television host formerly of Fox News, wrote a notorious essay
about buying flood insurance on his new beachfront vacation home entitled Confessions of a
Welfare Queen. John Stossel, Confessions of a Welfare Queen: How Rich Bastards Like Me Rip
Off Taxpayers for Millions of Dollars, REASON (Mar. 1, 2004), http://reason.com/archives/
2004/03/01/confessions-of-a-welfare-queen [https://perma.cc/8AD9-TLA9]. The examples I
have in mind are more prosaic. See infra note 227.
227. Virtually every story about the woes of the National Flood Insurance Program features
jarring examples prominently. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, How Washington Made Harvey
Worse, POLITICO (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/29/astorm-made-in-washington-215549 [https://perma.cc/UN24-JCL3] (citing home valued at less
than $115,000 that has flooded sixteen times in eighteen years, resulting in $800,000 in claims);
Noel King, National Flood Insurance Program Will Pay Out Billions for a Few Properties, NPR
(Nov. 21, 2017, 4:45 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/21/552708255/national-floodinsurance-program-will-pay-out-billions-for-a-few-properties [https://perma.cc/22X7-MXWP]
(reporting a home that cost $83,000 in 1992 and has received $700,000 in claims payments since
2009); Eric Lipton, Felicity Barringer & Mary Williams Walsh, Flood Insurance, Already
Fragile, Faces New Stress, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2012), https://nyti.ms/2vwAVR5
[https://perma.cc/K6Y9-BMJT] (citing homes in Biloxi, Mississippi, and Humble, Texas, that—
despite being worth $183,000 and $116,000, respectively—have received $1.47 million and $2
million in claims payments from the NFIP).
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it is certainly true that more could be done to address the problem. Indeed,
many of those who have been flooded repeatedly express interest in being
bought out and relocating.228
But even when a flood has happened, the knowledge it creates about flood
risk going forward is often amorphous.229 One study attempted to measure
“whether a severe flood causes homeowners to update their assessment of
flood risk” by looking at changes in property values in St. Louis County
following the severe flooding there in 1993.230 The study concluded that
property values in 100-year floodplains were not affected to a statistically
significant degree by the flooding, suggesting that the market had already
been aware of the flood risk and priced it in.231 Prices did fall in 500-year
floodplains, and in communities along the Missouri and Mississippi rivers
generally, implying that the real estate market was capitalizing new
information about flood risk.232
The task of communicating flood risk to non-experts with enough
precision and urgency to induce them to take relatively simple steps like
buying flood insurance has proved so challenging that many experts have
concluded that simple messages are most effective. Reflecting on Hurricane
Irma’s impact in Florida, Roy Wright—until recently the Director of the
NFIP—said that people should pay less attention to flood maps: “We really
gotta help people move beyond and quit focusing on the lines,” he told the
Miami Herald.233 Instead, he suggested, everyone living in Florida should
consider themselves at risk, and buy flood insurance.234 Others have echoed
the sentiment.235

228. See Michael Kimmelman, Lessons from Hurricane Harvey: Houston’s Struggle Is
America’s Tale, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2jh20r1 [https://perma.cc/CH97RJ6H] (profiling several homeowners “hoping for a buyout”).
229. Statistically, the occurrence of an event with a 0.1% chance of occurring should tell us
nothing about the chance of a similar event occurring in the following year. Realistically, on the
other hand, such an event may lead to a significant recalculation of the odds of similar storms, in
a field in which estimates are based on roughly a century of data at best.
230. Carolyn Kousky, Learning from Extreme Events: Risk Perceptions after the Flood, 86
LAND ECON. 395, 395 (2010).
231. Id. at 415–17.
232. Id. at 417–18.
233. Jenny Staletovich, America’s Flood Insurance Chief Has a Message for All Floridians:
You’re at Risk, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 5, 2018, 6:51 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/
weather/hurricane/article203631769.html [https://perma.cc/6D4G-BXZZ].
234. Id.
235. Brian K. Sullivan, ‘100-Year Floods’ Happen More Often Than People Think, INS. J.
(Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2016/04/22/406148.htm
[https://perma.cc/6HSJ-7SQQ] (“If you live in Houston, buy flood insurance.”).
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Ideally, flood insurance premiums themselves would be an effective way
to communicate the risk of flooding. This is, after all, one of the ways in
which risk-rated premiums are said to help combat moral hazard, by
translating the often difficult to quantify risks people take into dollars and
cents. Subsidized flood insurance premiums have thus created a sort of
vicious cycle: They mask the true risk people face, lulling them into a false
sense of security while also undermining the argument that they knew what
they were getting into and thus do not deserve financial support. This is a
hard cycle to break, because any change in the structure of subsidized rates
can have enormous impacts on the people who have benefited from them in
the past.
The experience of New York City during and after Hurricane Sandy
illustrates many of these problems. Before Sandy, New York’s FIRMs dated
from the 1980s.236 Flooding from the storm far exceeded even the 500-year
flood zones the maps depicted. The city’s mayor at the time, Michael
Bloomberg, was frank in acknowledging that there was nothing that could be
done to eliminate the risk entirely, but insisted that homes would be rebuilt
to make them more resistant to flooding, and called on FEMA to update its
maps.237 The following year, FEMA released preliminary revised FIRMs,
with 100-year floodplains that closely tracked areas that had flooded during
Sandy. The maps would have doubled the number of people living in flood
zones.
Six months after the preliminary maps were released, the city filed a 180page appeal, arguing that FEMA had overestimated both the base flood
elevation and the size of the 100-year flood zone.238 FEMA’s proposed maps,
the city argued, overstated the size of the flood zone by 35%—an area that is
236. Technically, FEMA had made revisions to these maps, most recently in 2007, but these
revisions were not based on new technical studies. As FEMA explained, New York City’s FIRMs
might have been dated 2007, but they were “based on storm surge models and statistical analyses
from the 1980s.” FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, DESIGNING FOR FLOOD LEVELS ABOVE THE
BFE AFTER HURRICANE SANDY 3 (2013), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/
1381405016896-8bdeadf634c366439c35568a588feb24/SandyRA5DesignAboveBFE_508_
FINAL2.pdf [https://perma.cc/UA3G-Z5QX]. FEMA vaguely warned that base flood elevations
and flood hazard zones based on such old studies “may understate actual flood risk” and suggested
that people consulting the FIRM verify “[t]he date of the technical studies . . . by reviewing the
associated FIS [Flood Insurance Study].” Id.
237. David W. Chen & Michael M. Grynbaum, Mayor Pledges to Rebuild and Fortify Coast,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2012), https://nyti.ms/2GtVt3D [https://perma.cc/5Z4F-SZX2].
238. Letter from Daniel A. Zarrilli, Dir., City of N.Y. Mayor’s Office of Recovery &
Resiliency, to Michael Moriarty, Dir., Mitigation Div. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency Region 2
(June 26, 2015), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/floodmaps/images/content/pages/1-NYC%
20FEMA%20Appeal%20FINAL%20with%20Appendices%20and%20Cover%20Letter%20062
52015_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CRK-LNSB].
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home to 170,000 people.239 In addition to its technical objections, the city
commissioned the RAND Corporation to study the financial burden the
proposed maps would have on its residents. The RAND Corporation’s report,
foreshadowing the nationwide conclusions in FEMA’s own affordability
analysis,240 found that flood insurance was already too expensive for many
New Yorkers, and that the new preliminary maps would make the problem
worse.241 The City of New York and FEMA recently announced that the end
result of this dispute will be two maps: one that depicts the city’s current
flood risk for purposes of the NFIP’s rates and purchase mandate, and another
that depicts future flood risk, for purposes of the City’s planning and
mitigation efforts.242 Under these circumstances, residents can arguably be
forgiven for not knowing when or how badly their homes might flood.243
Of course, this argument should not be taken too far. It is not true that
nobody has any meaningful sense of the flood risk they face. In many places
the risk, especially over longer time horizons, is glaringly obvious. Indeed,
despite its traditional insistence on subjective knowledge, the tort doctrine of
assumption of risk has long incorporated an obviousness exception, under
which some risks are so obvious that a plaintiff can be said to have known of
239. Id.
240. See generally FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 236.
241. DIXON ET AL., supra note 224, at xxv.
242. Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Mayor De Blasio and FEMA Announce
Plan to Revise NYC’s Flood Maps (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2016/10/
17/mayor-de-blasio-and-fema-announce-plan-revise-nycs-flood-maps [https://perma.cc/RQ777CQB].
243. Chen, supra note 219 (“The various maps that the residents have used to determine the
flood boundaries—whether from FEMA, the Department of City Planning or other sources—
offer conflicting results about whether a house is in the flood plain, Ms. Roff said. On her own
block of bungalows, she said, one homeowner pays $5,000 a year in premiums. A few doors
down, another does not have insurance. Just beyond that, a new homeowner is spending $300,000
to raise a house 20 feet like ‘a castle in the sky,’ she said, thereby avoiding paying any
insurance.”).
Another theme that is highlighted by New York’s dispute with FEMA is the way local
governments have in some instances worked to keep their constituents in a state of ignorance
about their flood risk in the interest of avoiding the pain of higher insurance premiums and other
effects on the local tax base. Indeed, New York is an outlier in working to develop a forwardlooking map to help its residents understand their flood risk. Perhaps the most notorious example
is the North Carolina state legislature’s decision, responding to pressure from officials in the Outer
Banks, to overrule a state scientific panel and set unrealistically low assumptions of future sealevel rise for purposes of evaluating private development and public infrastructure investments.
See Isaac Stanley-Becker, Scientists Warned of Rising Sea Levels in North Carolina. Republican
Lawmakers Shelved Their Recommendations, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/09/14/scientists-warned-ofrising-sea-levels-in-north-carolina-republican-lawmakers-shelved-their-recommendations/
[https://perma.cc/8KVS-6HFS].
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them as a matter of law.244 The danger of slipping on ice is a classic
example,245 as is the danger of diving headfirst into a shallow pool.246 The
question is whether a risk is so obvious that “it is clear that any person of
normal intelligence must have understood the danger.”247
This idea is certainly applicable in the flood context. Sea level rise is
already changing life in many places in the United States, particularly along
the East Coast.248 Nobody buying waterfront property in 2019 in Miami, the
Outer Banks of North Carolina, barrier islands along the Jersey Shore, or any
number of other high-risk locations could credibly express shock if a
damaging storm comes along. My aim is not to suggest that all Americans
are laboring in ignorance of flood risk, but rather to suggest that we should
not assume, as many too often do, that flood risk is obvious to everyone
affected by it.
IV.

CHOICE

Simply understanding one’s risk of flood—hard as that is—is not enough.
In order to have assumed the risk of flooding one must, armed with the
requisite knowledge, choose to encounter the risk. Under the pure laissezfaire conception of assumption of risk that applied in torts cases from the
early twentieth century, formal choice was all that mattered. Thus Lamson,
not being enslaved and thus technically free to leave his job for fear of falling
axes, was said to have assumed any risk of injury by choosing to stay. That
formalist vision of the nature of choice in a modern economy has long been
abandoned; we now understand that people make choices about things like
employment in an economic and social context that constrains their behavior,
such that merely remaining in a job no longer feels morally significant. This
Part argues that the choice of where to live is similarly constrained. There are
244. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, TORTS 310 (2d ed. 1955) (“[T]here are certain risks which anyone
of adult age must be taken to appreciate . . . . [W]here it is clear that any person of normal
intelligence . . . must have understood the danger, the issue must be decided by the court.”); W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 488 (5th ed. 1984)
(“There are some things . . . which are so far a matter of common knowledge in the community,
that in the absence of some satisfactory explanation a denial of such knowledge simply is not to
be believed.”).
245. PROSSER, supra note 244, at 310.
246. See Griebler v. Doughboy Recreational Inc., 466 N.W.2d 897, 901 (Wis. 1991); see also
O’Sullivan v. Shaw, 726 N.E.2d 951, 956 (Mass. 2000) (collecting cites).
247. PROSSER, supra note 2444, at 301; Poole v. Coakley & Williams Constr. Co., Inc., 31
A.3d 212, 223 (Md. 2011) (distinguishing danger of slipping on visible snow and ice from danger
of slipping on invisible “black” ice).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 67, 179, 189.
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a host of obstacles—legal, economic, emotional, and cognitive—that act as
constraints on the choices we make when moving to or remaining in a floodprone house. These obstacles mean that for some (but not all), the choice to
encounter the risk of flood is not much of a choice at all.
A. The Choice to Remain
Americans are not as mobile as perhaps they should be, and rates of
interstate mobility have been declining for decades.249 As different regions
and metropolitan areas of the country face widely divergent economic
futures, this lack of mobility has become a problem that has attracted
enormous attention. To economists, in particular, mobility is the free market
solution to the problem of declining economic sectors and regions; if median
wages in West Virginia are a fraction of what they are in New York, then
clearly there would be gains in welfare (and GDP) if people simply left West
Virginia in search of the economic opportunities offered by more prosperous
locales.
For decades, various efforts aimed at addressing poverty and inequality
have thus focused on helping move people from one place to another, either
within a particular city, as in the case of Chicago’s Gautreaux program, or
nationally, as in the case of the federal Moving to Opportunity program.250
Social scientists studying the outcomes of these programs have tended to
conclude that moving to a more prosperous and integrated area can indeed
have significant positive impacts on a family’s life outcomes.251 Convincing
people to move (and to stay) has, however, proven to be more difficult.
Perhaps the most significant factors that dissuade people from moving are
the ones that are hardest to quantify. The places we live are where we make
friends and raise families, and moving often means destroying or
compromising these social networks.252 For many of us, the neighborhoods,
towns, or cities we call home are deeply ingrained in our self-identities. Many
people simply love their homes, and express an inability to imagine life
elsewhere.253 In many flood prone parts of the country, residential housing
249. David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE
L.J. 78, 81–82 (2017).
250. Id. at 104–05.
251. Id. at 107.
252. Id. at 123.
253. One empirical study that examined willingness to relocate among those affected by
Hurricane Sandy found little relationship between households’ proximity to the ocean (a rough
proxy for flood risk) and their interest in relocating. The authors speculate that “non-geophysical
factors, such as household-level confidence in the ability to adapt and continue habitation in such
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patterns are still shaped by a history of racial discrimination, which often
forced minority communities into low-lying areas.254
There are many more quantifiable obstacles to leaving home. For
homeowners, the overwhelming majority of NFIP policyholders, moving
typically involves selling a home and buying a new one, which entails
significant transaction costs. Homeowners whose home equity has been
reduced or even eliminated by economic downturns—or by a flood—might
face particular obstacles to leaving.255 There are less obvious financial costs
to moving too. Thirteen percent of Americans work for state and local
governments, and 92% of those workers have defined benefit public
pensions.256 Many of these plans have long vesting periods and other features
that restrict their beneficiaries’ ability to move.257 The possibility of losing
access to various public benefits is another disincentive to moving.
In order to leave a flood-prone home one must have somewhere else to go.
Along with obstacles to leaving a particular place are obstacles to entering
another. Land use restrictions have attracted a great deal of negative attention
recently, as housing prices in certain desirable areas of the country have
skyrocketed.258 To many, restrictions on development have made large
contributions to this problem, thereby making it harder for economically
prosperous regions to attract new workers from underperforming areas.259
Many of the regions that are attracting new workers are of course also floodprone; my point is not that zoning laws keep people from moving to dry areas,
but rather that they are one of many factors that combine to make the prospect
of moving out of a flood zone too costly to contemplate. Occupational
licensing is another barrier to entry worth mentioning. The number of jobs
that require state licenses has increased dramatically in recent decades,260
locations, values, and other qualitative personal factors play a larger role.” Anamaria Bukvic et
al., The Role of Proximity to Waterfront in Residents’ Relocation Decision-Making PostHurricane Sandy, 154 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 8, 8 (2018).
254. See, e.g., Craig E. Colten, Basin Street Blues: Drainage and Environmental Equity in
New Orleans 1890–1930, 28 J. HIST. GEOGRAPHY 237 (2002).
255. Schleicher, supra note 249, at 128–29.
256. Id. at 124.
257. Id. (“[E]ighteen states require a teacher to stay in the system for eight or more years
before she can access her benefits.”).
258. Id. at 114–15.
259. One study found that land use restrictions lowered aggregate U.S. growth by 36% from
1964 to 2009. Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation
1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21,154, 2015, rev. 2018). Schleicher notes
that economists have come up with a broad range of estimates of the negative effect of zoning
laws on GDP. Schleicher, supra note 249, at 103 n.101.
260. Schleicher, supra note 249, at 117 & n.166. To illustrate the surprising breadth of these
laws, Schleicher offers some examples: “animal breeder[s], auctioneer[s], bartender[s], florist[s],
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such that roughly 25% of the workforce is now covered by state licensing
laws—a larger percentage than minimum wage earners or private sector
union members.261 The burden of acquiring the licenses needed varies
tremendously, but the broader point is that licensing regimes “create
substantial barriers to entry for many classes of workers.”262
B. Notice and the Choice to Arrive
The decision to move to a flood-prone home is more likely to be a choice
made under conditions of freedom than the decision to remain in a home one
already owns. The interaction between knowledge and choice has an
important temporal quality: if one learns the flood risk associated with a
property and then decides to move in, the case for having assumed the risk is
much stronger.
Unfortunately, there is no federal law requiring that buyers be notified in
advance of a home’s flood risk. Many states have such laws, although many
do not. A recent report by the NRDC compiled the laws on flood disclosure
in all fifty states.263 Twenty-one states have no statutory or regulatory
requirement that buyers be notified of a home’s flood history.264 Florida, one
of the country’s epicenters of flood risk, is one such state.265 In many states
that do have disclosure requirements, the laws are vaguely worded or carry
weak penalties. New York, for instance, does require that sellers disclose
whether a property is located in a floodplain, but the statutory penalty for
failing to make this disclosure is a $500 credit towards the purchase price at
closing, a punishment so low that, the NRDC reported, many sellers simply
opt not to say anything.266 Louisiana and Mississippi, on the other hand, both

interior designer[s], . . . hair braider[s], and scrap metal recycler[s]” all now require licenses in
some states. Id. at 118.
261. Id. at 118.
262. Id. at 120. The effect of these barriers has been observed empirically. For example,
“barbers and hairdressers are 27% less likely to move between states but only 7% less likely to
move within state than their peers in other [non-licensed] occupations.” Id. (alteration in original).
263. See Joel Scata, Home Buyers Face Stacked Deck to Learn of Past Floods, NAT.
RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL: EXPERT BLOG (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/joelscata/home-buyers-face-stacked-decks-learn-past-floods [https://perma.cc/7CJ3-CX3Y]; see
also How States Stack Up on Flood Disclosure, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL,
https://www.nrdc.org/flood-disclosure-map [https://perma.cc/QT4R-7CFK] (last visited Mar. 4,
2019).
264. Scata, supra note 263.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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have mandatory, broadly worded disclosure laws.267 To make matters worse,
federal law prohibits FEMA from releasing claims history on individual
properties, preventing buyers from finding this information themselves.268
Of course, there will always be a variety of factors that affect a choice.
The mere presence of a range of costs supporting the decision to remain in a
home despite the risk of flood does not necessarily mean that the decision
was not made freely. The question must be whether the circumstances compel
a particular choice so strongly that they amount to a form of coercion, such
that the choice isn’t freely made at all.269 To put the point another way, is the
alternative course of action real (in the sense of truly available), or illusory?
This question cannot have one answer for all Americans who live with a risk
of flooding. After all, some people do choose to leave their flood-prone
homes.270 My goal here is to show merely that some subset of people truly
have not chosen to expose themselves to the flood risk they face.
We are comfortable with the idea that some workers’ “choice” to perform
dangerous jobs is no choice at all, while for others the choice is meaningful.
There is a world of difference between the factory worker who knows the risk
of mangled limbs and remains at the loom and the highly compensated lawyer
who knows the risk of stress, inadequate sleep, and a career spent sitting down
and remains at the word processor. So too is there a world of difference
between the third-generation resident of New Orleans’ Lower Ninth Ward

267. NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 263.
268. See Ehlmann v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 4:12-CV-1392-RWS, 2013 WL 3724906,
at *4–5 (E.D. Mo. July 15, 2013) (denying FOIA request to compel FEMA to release names and
addresses for NFIP policies on repetitive loss properties); see also Forest Guardians v. FEMA,
410 F.3d 1214, 1221 (10th Cir. 2005) (affirming FEMA’s refusal to disclose location data of
individual NFIP policyholders).
269. Compare Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 376 A.2d 329, 333 (R.I. 1977), in
which a plaintiff was struck in the eye by a hockey puck while watching a game. The fact that she
sat closer to the rink than was her habit because those were the only seats available “[did] not
make the purchase of those seats any less voluntary.” Id.
270. The examples tend to be small in number relative to the scale of the problem. See
Alexander B. Lemann, Stronger Than the Storm: Disaster Law in a Defiant Age, 78 LA. L. REV.
437, 454–55 (2018). Voters in Harris County recently approved a $2.5 billion bond issue to fund
efforts to mitigate Houston’s flood risk, $184 million of which will be allocated to buyouts. Zach
Despart, Harris County Voters Pass $2.5 Billion Flood Bond One Year After Harvey, HOUS.
CHRON. (Aug. 25, 2018), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-weather/
hurricaneharvey/article/Harris-County-voters-pass-2-5-billion-flood-bond-13182842
[https://perma.cc/S39Y-6WCY].
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who inherited her home and cannot locate the deed271 and the titan of finance
who chooses to build on the idyllic barrier island.272
In attempting to draw a line between those who occupy flood-prone homes
as a matter of choice and those who do so out of some form of necessity,
some general observations can be made. First, it seems obvious that there is
a strong correlation between freedom and wealth. Poverty is inversely
correlated with mobility,273 and positively correlated with flood risk.274
Indeed, one study that analyzed the effects of hurricanes on population
changes in the Gulf Coast found that “advantaged groups” like young white
people “are more likely to move out of or avoid moving into harm’s way
while socially vulnerable groups have fewer choices.”275 Our sense of who
has chosen to bear the risk of flooding should incorporate the idea that the
less well-off are less likely to have had a meaningful opportunity to choose
where they live. Importantly, this justification for socializing flood risk is
distinct from an appeal to pure need.
Second, there is probably a correlation between housing tenure and the
freedom of one’s choice to live in a particular place. While this will not be
true in many cases, it seems likely that those who have lived in one place for
many decades are less likely to have a meaningful opportunity to leave,
whether because of strong social or cultural ties, limited means to undertake
an expensive move, lower transferability of skills, age, or a host of other
factors. Indeed, in its report on affordability, FEMA noted that its empirical
findings “support[ed] our extensive anecdotal evidence that there is a
significant population in the [special flood hazard area] of lower-income
families who have either inherited their homes or are retirees who are
particularly sensitive to the financial burden of flood insurance.”276 The
271. See, e.g., Kathy Finn, Blighted Houses Still Mar New Orleans a Decade After Katrina,
REUTERS (Aug. 23, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-katrina-blight/blightedhouses-still-mar-new-orleans-a-decade-after-katrina-idUSKCN0QS0FE20150823
[https://perma.cc/6UP3-ERA2] (“Many of homes [sic] in the Lower Ninth Ward were handed
down through several generations and it is unclear who holds the deed.”).
272. See, e.g., Katherine Clarke, The Secluded Island Hideaways for America’s Rich and
Famous, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-secluded-islandhideaways-where-americas-rich-and-famous-escape-1535038830
[https://perma.cc/HQ4X8JZG] (describing former Treasury Secretary and Goldman Sachs CEO Hank Paulson’s home on
Little St. Simons Island, which he bought for almost $33 million in 2015).
273. Schleicher, supra note 249, at 81–82 (noting that “mobility rates are lower among
disadvantaged groups”).
274. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 108, at 11.
275. John R. Logan, Sukriti Issar & Zengwang Xu, Trapped in Place? Segmented Resilience
to Hurricanes in the Gulf Coast, 1970-2005, 53 DEMOGRAPHY 1511, 1511 (2016).
276. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 108, at 13.
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converse of both factors is likely to be true as well. Those with plenty to spend
are more likely to have a meaningful choice of where to live, as are those who
have moved more recently.277 The NFIP could do more to divide these groups
of policyholders, subsidizing those who made no choice to encounter a risk
of flooding and penalizing those who have.
V.

REFORM

Highlighting the importance of assumption of risk in the moral calculus of
flood insurance leads to a subtle but important shift in emphasis in avenues
for reform of the program. One goal of this Article has been to problematize
the near-universal call for actuarial rates. Many have argued that there may
be good reasons to subsidize rates for some portion of homeowners on the
basis of need. In addition to this argument from need, an argument from
involuntariness should be recognized. Because many homeowners do not
knowingly choose to accept the risk of flooding they face, they arguably
should not be made to bear the full actuarial cost of that risk. To return to the
healthcare analogy, we should think of the costs of flooding as lying
somewhere between the costs of smoking and the costs of being born female
and thus subject to a hybrid system, in which insurance premiums are
structured so that they are neither fully actuarial for everyone always nor so
totally socialized that they bear no relationship to the quantum of risk each
policyholder faces.
On the other hand, many people do understand the risk of flooding and do
choose to expose themselves to it. My argument is not that everyone currently
paying subsidized rates should be allowed to continue to do so indefinitely,
only that imposing actuarial rates is in some cases morally problematic. There
is also an important feedback loop at work here: actuarial rates are an
important source of information about the flood risk a property faces and thus
can create the condition of knowledge that helps justify their imposition. To
put the point another way, creating an unlimited entitlement to subsidized
premiums that runs with a property misleads people about the risk they face
when they move in, and undermines the argument that they knowingly chose
the risk and thus should not be entitled to pay subsidized rates going forward.
All of this suggests the need to focus on avenues of reform that get at the
very heart of why the NFIP has proved to be such a difficult political puzzle.
277. For a particularly glaring example, consider the phenomenon of homeowners in upscale
communities located on barrier islands who respond to severe storms by building larger homes.
See Eli D. Lazarus et al., Building Back Bigger in Hurricane Strike Zones, 1 NATURE
SUSTAINABILITY 759, 759 (2018) (finding that new homes built following hurricanes in five
coastal communities had on average 55% larger footprints).
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The major challenge is to reconcile the long-term need to manage our
individual and collective exposure to flood risk without unfairly imposing
short-term hardship on people who did not meaningfully choose to encounter
this risk. There are two roles of government that are here locked in seemingly
irreconcilable conflict: the obligation to enact rational policy that serves the
national interest over the long term, on one hand, and the obligation to help
those among us who are seen to be victims of circumstances beyond their
control, on the other. At least part of the solution, the focus on assumption of
risk suggests, lies in improving Americans’ understanding of their risk of
flooding and creating meaningful options to reduce that risk without in the
process destroying the home equity of people who did not themselves have
the benefits of knowledge and choice when they moved in.
A. Knowledge
Americans’ knowledge of the flood risk they face is, in general, woeful.
Improving this knowledge begins with improving and refining the scientific
understanding of flood risk and how climate change will affect it in the
coming decades. FEMA should also improve its ability to incorporate the
latest science into its own risk calculations, which means both incorporating
new data and models faster than it has done in the past and beginning the
project of projecting how flood risks will change in the future. Keeping maps
up to date is another obvious goal. Fortunately, all of these ideas have
attracted attention, and this work is underway to varying degrees.
Flood Insurance Rate Maps, however, will always by necessity be highly
complex and technical documents. With their bewildering array of zones and
codes and symbols, they resist easy comprehension.278 It is worth thinking
about abandoning the idea of the FIRM as the primary means of
communicating flood risk to property owners. The former head of the NFIP
felt the need to tell Floridians that they should ignore the lines on FEMA’s
maps and instead just buy flood insurance.279 There should be a way to
capture that idea in map form. Such a map would ideally eschew bright lines
and the misleading impression of safety they can create and instead show
large zones with fuzzy edges giving people a sense that flood risk is
something that should concern them. FEMA has made some admirable
strides in this regard, setting up a dedicated, relatively easy to use website
with zoomable maps instead of the large-file pdfs of yore, but the maps it
278. See URBAN FLOODING, supra note 205, at 34–35 (2018).
279. See supra notes 233–35 and accompanying text.
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displays are still FIRMs, and are not designed to create a basic understanding
of flood risk in the minds of non-experts.280 In 2009, FEMA began a project
to modernize its maps, and part of that effort included developing “risk
maps,” simpler, more colorful, less detailed, non-legally binding maps whose
goal is to help communicate flood risk in a way that is legible to regular
people.281 However, these maps are not available in many parts of the country
and are extraordinarily hard to locate on FEMA’s website.282 New York City
is currently developing two different maps: a FIRM that depicts current flood
risk in all its complexity, and a forward-looking map designed to guide future
development and land use decisions.283
It is also worth looking outside the map entirely. Reading a map is a
challenge for many people. Maps are also easy to ignore. It was once fairly
common to mark historical flood depths in a prominent place in small towns
and cities. In the center of Ellicott City, Maryland, there is a wooden pillar
supporting a railroad trestle that shows flood depths going back to 1868.284
On the coast of Japan, hundreds of stone tablets, some more than six hundred
years old, warn of tsunamis past and future: “Do not build your homes below
this point!”285 In New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina, a brown line
marking the height of the standing water that filled much of the city remained
280. See FEMA Flood Map Service Center, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
https://msc.fema.gov/portal/home [https://perma.cc/KKS2-5V4M] (last visited Mar. 4, 2019).
281. URBAN FLOODING, supra note 205, at 34–35.
282. See id. (noting that the maps are “not endorsed by FEMA”).
283. See Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, supra note 242. A small handful of
other mapping tools that are designed to be more user-friendly have been developed. Texas
A&M’s Institute for Hazard Mitigation Planning and Research has developed a website called
“Buyers Be-Where” that displays a simple flood risk score for any address in one of six major
cities. See BUYERS BE-WHERE, www.buyers-bewhere.com [https://perma.cc/U3RR-T5WA] (last
visited Jan. 23, 2019). National Flood Services, a for-profit company that acts as a servicer of
flood insurance policies, has developed a site called floodtools.com with similar functionality and
national coverage. See FLOOD TOOLS, www.floodtools.com [https://perma.cc/33AD-KCCP] (last
visited Jan. 23, 2018).
284. See Ellicott City Flood Stages, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
File:Ellicott_City_Flood_Stages.jpg [https://perma.cc/FU5H-C3ES] (last updated Mar. 21,
2012); see also URBAN FLOODING, supra note 205, at 34 (reproducing a photograph of flood depth
marker in Cedar Rapids, Iowa).
285. Martin Fackler, Tsunami Warnings, Written in Stone, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/21/world/asia/21stones.html?smid=pl-share
[https://perma.cc/YK68-4LM5]. Of course, many of the stones were ignored as development
boomed following the Second World War. Id.; see also ROBERT MEYER & HOWARD
KUNREUTHER, THE OSTRICH PARADOX: WHY WE UNDERPREPARE FOR DISASTERS 21–22 (2017)
(noting that effects of 2011 tsunami in Miyako were worsened by development in defiance of
stones’ warning). Nevertheless, some towns have heeded the stones’ injunction. In Aneyoshi, a
tiny village, no development has occurred below the stone; its warning has been supplemented by
a blue line painted in the road marking the height of the waters. See Fackler, supra.

220

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

on every building. For years it served as a grim reminder of the water’s depth.
Although most of it has been cleaned away, there have been efforts to
publicly mark the depth of the flood.286 This idea could be expanded.287
Streets in flood zones could be painted blue. We might also consider tangible,
visible projections of the effects of sea level rise, such as pillars indicating
the projected water depth in 2100.
Improving enforcement of the NFIP’s purchase mandate would also
improve homeowners’ knowledge of the risk they face. Flood insurance
premiums set at actuarial rates have long been recognized as important
signals.288 In addition to undermining the financial viability of the program,
underenforcement of the purchase mandate deprives homeowners of the
important signal that being required to purchase flood insurance sends. Even
when homeowners pay subsidized rates, they should be informed of what
their rates would be if they reflected the full measure of the risk they face.
Finally, a federal, mandatory notice requirement that applies to any real
estate transaction would do much to improve the state of knowledge when
people move. This idea is beginning to gain traction, as criticism has been
levelled at the current patchwork of state laws (some better than others) that
govern disclosure of flood risk.289 In Congress, several of the most recent
proposals for reform of the NFIP have included notice provisions.290 Helping
prospective homeowners understand the risk at the moment they choose
whether to take it on could be enormously powerful.

286. Two artists have painted telephone poles blue up to the depth of standing water along a
major boulevard. Doug McCash, Art Critic Doug McCash’s Guide to 19 Pieces of Outdoor New
Orleans Art, TIMES-PICAYUNE, http://blog.nola.com/dougmaccash/2009/04/art_critic_doug_
maccash_rates_15.html [https://perma.cc/FF44-HM8W] (last updated Apr. 8, 2009).
287. URBAN FLOODING, supra note 205, at 34 (“Use of high-water mark signs [ ] that identify
the height of historical floods can also alert residents to their risks and lead them to possible
mitigation methods.”).
288. See Scales, supra note 13, at 44.
289. See supra notes 263–67 and accompanying text.
290. Flood Insurance Affordability and Sustainability Act of 2017, S. 1313, 115th Cong.
§ 203 (directing FEMA to promulgate regulations “for the disclosure of flood risk hazards with
respect to any residential or commercial property that is offered for sale”); 21st Century Flood
Insurance Reform Act, H.R. 2874, 115th Cong. § 109(a)–(b) (passed by House, Nov. 14, 2017)
(requiring state and local governments to impose “a duty on any seller or lessor of improved real
estate located [in a flood zone] to provide to any purchaser or lessee of such property a property
flood hazard disclosure”).

51:0163]

ASSUMPTION OF FLOOD RISK
B.

221

Choice

Much could also be done to empower homeowners to choose to expose
themselves to the risk of flood—or to avoid it. One fruitful target of reform
is FEMA’s buyout program. Participation in purely voluntary buyout
programs has typically been regarded as disappointing.291 To many who study
the issue, there are various ways in which buyouts could be made more
appealing.292 Streamlining the process of being bought out would make the
prospect more palatable, as would creating a national, freestanding program
of unlimited duration rather than the patchwork federal/state partnerships that
currently spring up after major storms and die out several years later.293
Another related option is to explore large-scale buyouts of entire
neighborhoods or towns rather than piecemeal buyouts of whoever is willing
to leave. This approach has the benefit of avoiding the “jack-o-lantern” effect
of leaving expensive, unattractive gaps in a community as its population
declines, shouldering local governments with expensive infrastructure to
maintain and less tax base with which to do it.294 There have been a few
scattered successes relocating entire communities, but they have all been
small and rural and therefore enjoyed access to nearby sites to which they
could be moved.295 In recent years, many have also been Native American
communities with tribal governments.296 Whether this approach is workable
in more densely populated areas is an open question. So far, the use of
eminent domain to force holdouts away from flood zones is a political nonstarter.

291. See Christopher Flavelle, A New Strategy for Climate Change? Retreat, BLOOMBERG,
(Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-08-22/nj-s-blue-acresprogram-a-new-strategy-for-climate-change
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180208072748/
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-08-22/nj-s-blue-acres-program-a-new-strategyfor-climate-change] (detailing struggles of New Jersey’s Superstorm Sandy Blue Acres program,
which in 2016, four years after the storm, had purchased 471 homes out of 14,865 that were
eligible).
292. See Sherri Brokopp Binder, Charlene K. Baker & John P. Barile, Rebuild or Relocate?
Resilience and Postdisaster Decision-Making After Hurricane Sandy, 56 AM. J. COMMUNITY
PSYCHOL. 180, 194 (2015); Anamaria Bukvic & Graham Owen, Attitudes Towards Relocation
Following Hurricane Sandy: Should We Stay or Should We Go?, 41 DISASTERS 101, 103–04
(2017); A.R. Siders, Social Justice Implications of US Managed Retreat Buyout Programs, 152
CLIMATIC CHANGE 239 (2019).
293. Bukvic & Owen, supra note 292, at 103–04 (“[T]here is not a single government agency
that has the authority to administer a relocation programme even if people want it, there is no
funding designated for this process, no criteria for the identification of relocation destinations,
and no mechanisms for public participation.”).
294. See Flavelle, supra note 291.
295. See Lemann, supra note 270, at 490–92.
296. Id.
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The Effect of Assumption

There are also ways in which the assumption of risk idea could be
incorporated more strongly into the rate structure of the NFIP. Currently,
many homeowners living in homes that predate the issuance of a FIRM are
entitled to subsidized rates, regardless of when they moved in. This approach
may have made sense from the perspective of assumption of risk when it was
first implemented, but it is harder to justify today. If an old house is sold to a
new buyer who makes a free choice to live there with full knowledge of the
risk it faces, it is hard to see why the age of the house should matter. The
assumption of risk principle suggests that entitlement to actuarial rates should
turn on conditions having to do with an individual person’s choices, not the
physical characteristics of the home they live in. A focus on assumption of
risk thus supports the idea that subsidized rates should be phased out when
properties change hands.
Biggert-Waters contained a provision eliminating subsidized rates for new
homebuyers and new policyholders.297 Unfortunately, this provision was
repealed.298 The problem, as Congress quickly learned from many outraged
constituents, is that while this change may not have had any effect on the
rates current homeowners were obligated to pay, it did affect the purchase
price their homes could command, and thus their home equity.299 One way of
forcing new homebuyers to assume more of the risk of flooding without
penalizing current homeowners would be to buy out whatever portion of the
owner’s equity would be destroyed by increasing their flood insurance
premiums, although this is sure to be expensive and controversial. An easier
approach, and one that has attracted some interest from Congress, is to phase
out subsidized rates gradually, with increases capped at, say, 10% per year,
apparently on the theory that the economic pain will be much easier to
manage if it is inflicted slowly.300
297. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141,
§ 100205(a)(1)(B), 126 Stat. 916.
298. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 3, 128
Stat. 1021–22 (striking portions of Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L.
No. 112-141, § 100205, 126 Stat. 916, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4014(g)(1)–(2)).
299. See Alvarez & Robertson, supra note 48; Coral Davenport, Popular Flood Insurance
Law Is Target of Both Political Parties, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 28, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/us/politics/popular-flood-insurance-law-is-target-of-bothpolitical-parties.html [https://perma.cc/ELW4-Q5MT] (noting that after passage of BiggertWaters, “homeowners near coasts, rivers and wetlands saw their insurance rates soar and their
property values plummet,” leading to “frustration [that] erupted into a grass-roots lobbying
campaign to roll back” Biggert-Waters).
300. See Sustainable, Affordable, and Efficient (SAFE) National Flood Insurance Program
Reauthorization Act of 2017, H.R. 3285, 115th Cong. § 102(b) (“[T]he Administrator may not,
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The fact of being flooded arguably has a significant impact on an owner’s
knowledge of the risk she faces, and it could also be made to have a more
significant impact on flood insurance premiums.301 The NFIP currently
requires that an old home be elevated above base flood elevation if it is more
than 50% damaged in a flood. This threshold could be reduced, so that any
amount of flood damage leading to an insurance claim destroys the home’s
entitlement to subsidized rates going forward. Of course, the 50% damage
threshold also points to the importance of choice: a home that is “substantially
damaged,” to use FEMA’s term, is in a sense a blank slate. At the very least
the focus on assumption of risk supports maintaining this requirement.
Finally, the NFIP might consider treating coastal areas differently from
inland areas. The long-term risk of flooding for those living on the beach is
certainly much more obvious, and more serious, than for those living
elsewhere. The NFIP currently does not account for the future risk of sea
level rise in any way. That should certainly change at least as to the creation
of flood maps and the understanding of flood risk that goes into the
calculation of actuarial rates. In the fall of 2017 the House of Representatives
passed an NFIP reform bill—never taken up by the Senate—that, among
other things, directed FEMA to consider explicitly the difference between the
risks faced by coastal and inland properties in setting rates.302 That difference
might also be made to affect entitlement to subsidized rates, or even
entitlement to participate in the NFIP at all. There may be communities
whose prospects, even in the relatively near term, are so dim that they should
be regarded as uninsurable.
CONCLUSION
Reform of the National Flood Insurance Program is a crucially important
part of the work needed to prepare the United States for a near future in which
in any year, increase the amount of any covered cost by an amount that is more than 10 percent,
as compared with the amount of the covered cost during the previous year.”).
301. While courts applying the doctrine of assumption of risk in torts cases have insisted on
its subjectivity, they have been willing to conclude that a plaintiff had the requisite knowledge
when she witnessed the risk being realized in the past. See Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club,
Inc., 376 A.2d 329, 333 (R.I. 1977) (affirming judgment for defendant on assumption of risk
grounds where plaintiff, a spectator at a hockey game who was hit in the eye by a flying puck,
had attended thirty or forty games in the same arena and “was familiar with the flying-puck
syndrome. The only reasonable inference suggesting itself to us is that she knew there was a risk
that the puck would take flight and come to rest somewhere in the crowd.”).
302. Craig, supra note 13, at 30 (citing 21st Century Flood Insurance Reform Act, H.R. 2874,
115th Cong. § 105(b)–(c) (as passed by House, Nov. 16, 2017)).
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flooding becomes more common and costly than it already is. And yet
changing the NFIP’s rate structure so that all policyholders pay fully actuarial
rates—the near-universal recommendation of policy experts, academics, and
pundits—has proved to be excruciatingly difficult. In part this is because
many homeowners did not knowingly choose to encounter the risk they face,
making it morally problematic to saddle them with its full cost. Focusing on
issues of knowledge and choice in flood risk highlights the need to improve
these aspects of our approach to the problem. FEMA should do more to help
individuals understand the risk they face, and to offer them buyouts if they
do not like what they learn. Ultimately, the goal must be to transition away
from subsidized premiums in a way that is morally, and therefore politically,
palatable.

